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Abstract 
This dissertation consists of three independent but related studies based on the relationship 
between commodity prices, commodity abundance and the macroeconomy. Commodity prices 
play an important role in economic growth and prosperity, especially in commodity abundance 
countries. However, these countries are frequently exposed to commodity price volatility, 
which causes a high degree of uncertainty in the economy, reducing investment and economic 
growth. This affects government fiscal balance and consequently external debt. To consider 
this, the dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay examines the impact of commodity 
price volatility on fiscal balance, the second essay explores the relationship between 
commodity price volatility and external debt, and the third essay investigates the role of trade 
openness on the oil curse. 
The main objective of the first essay is to explore the impact of commodity price 
volatility on the government’s fiscal balance. Using a dynamic panel data model for 108 
countries from 1993 to 2018, this study finds that governments’ fiscal balances decrease with 
commodity price volatility. A one standard deviation increase in commodity price volatility 
leads to a decrease of approximately 0.04 units in the fiscal balance as a percentage of gross 
domestic product (GDP). In addition, we examine the role of real interest rates in influencing 
the relationship between commodity price volatility and fiscal balance. The empirical results 
suggest that the negative impact of commodity price volatility on fiscal balance increases with 
higher real interest rates. The implication of this result is that, under the sticky-price assumption, 
an accommodative monetary policy could be effective in moderating the negative effect of 
commodity price volatility on fiscal balance. 
The second essay investigates the relationship between commodity price volatility and 
external debt accumulation for 97 countries from 1993 to 2016. Using a dynamic panel data 
x 
 
model, this study finds that external debt accumulation increases with commodity price 
volatility. A one standard deviation increase in commodity price volatility contributes to a 0.17-
units increase in external debt as a share of gross national income (GNI). Further, this study 
explores the impact of commodity price volatility on external debt under alternative exchange 
rate regimes. We find evidence suggesting that the effect is significantly higher for countries 
with a fixed exchange rate regime. 
In the third essay, we re-examine the paradox that countries with abundant natural 
resources are poor in terms of real GDP per capita. This paradox, known as the ‘resource curse’, 
contradicts conventional intuition that natural resources improve economic growth and 
prosperity. Using dynamic panel data for 95 countries, this study revisits the ‘resource curse’ 
paradox in terms of oil resource abundance for the period 1980–2017. In addition, we study 
the role of trade openness in influencing the relationship between oil abundance and economic 
growth. The study finds that trade openness is a possible avenue to reduce the ‘resource curse’ 
problem because it allows countries to obtain competitive prices for their resources in the 
international market and to access advanced technologies to extract those resources more 
efficiently. Therefore, natural resource-rich economies can reduce the ‘resource curse’ by 
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Conventional wisdom dictates that primary commodity abundance contributes to improved 
economic growth and development. In general, commodity prices affect the macroeconomy in 
different ways. First, the income stream from primary commodities increases real living 
standards by financing higher levels of public and private consumption. Second, commodity 
extraction can finance higher level of investment. Lastly, since income from commodities is 
typically managed by the public sector, governments can invest this revenue in public goods, 
(e.g., infrastructure, education, health). Therefore, it is expected that commodity endowments 
benefit economic growth and development. 
However, in their seminal paper, Sachs and Warner (1995) and, thereafter, Gylfason 
(2000), Van der Ploeg (2011) and Cavalcanti, Mohaddes and Raissi (2012) claim that countries 
with abundant natural resources tend to grow more slowly than resource-poor countries—a 
phenomenon known as the ‘resource curse’. The literature explains several economic and 
political factors that may contribute to lower economic growth, such as poor institutional 
quality, political rent-seeking, commodity price volatility and lack of diversification. Of these 
factors, commodity prices are set as exogenous for most open economies and are frequently 
exposed to commodity price volatility. 1  Thus, this dissertation focuses on the impact of 
commodity price volatility on the macroeconomy.  
                                                          
1 Volatility is the degree of variation in the trading commodity prices series over time, as measured by standard 
deviation. According to Jacks, O’Rourke and Williamson (2011), since 1960, Latin American, South Asian and 
African primary commodity-exporting countries have faced three times higher volatility in terms of trade than 
manufacturing-exporting industrial economies. 
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Commodity price volatility generates uncertainty, makes it difficult to forecast future 
revenue from resource sectors and hinders effective planning for economic development 
(Badeeb, Lean & Clark 2017). In addition, Davis and Tilton (2005) argue that during periods 
of commodity price volatility, governments follow procyclical fiscal policies, which, in turn, 
may reduce the efficiency of both public and private investments. Therefore, commodity price 
volatility potentially contributes to lower economic growth. Figure 1.1 shows a negative 
relationship between global GDP growth rate and the global commodity price volatility index 
for the period from 1992 to 2018. The commodity price index includes all commodities i.e., 
both fuel and non-fuel commodities.   
Figure 1.1: GDP growth and commodity price volatility 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (2019). 
There is considerable literature exploring the impact of commodity price volatility on 
economic growth, but scant discussion of its relationship to fiscal policy issues. To fill this gap, 
we focus on the impact of commodity price volatility on the government’s fiscal performance 

















































issue is fundamental because commodity price volatility generates uncertainty of future 
revenue from commodities and the variability of such revenues may result in changes to public 
expenditure as the government reassesses its expected revenue stream, generating significant 
adjustment costs. Given their dependence on highly volatile revenue sources, these economies 
face a significant challenge to achieving fiscal balance.2 Therefore, the impact of commodity 
price volatility on the government’s fiscal balance is investigated in Chapter 2. 
In addition, Chapter 2 examines the role of the real interest rate in the relationship 
between commodity price volatility and fiscal balance. Our hypothesis is that lower real interest 
rates decrease the negative impact of commodity price volatility on fiscal balance by decreasing 
the cost of capital. As a result, it is expected that investment will increase with a lower real 
interest rate. During periods of slower economic growth, central banks (CB) can reduce the 
nominal interest rate. Due to the stickiness inflation assumption, the real interest rate decreases 
accordingly. Thus, the research questions for Chapter 2 are: 
Research questions for Chapter 2: (i) Does commodity price volatility affect the 
government’s fiscal balance? (ii) Does this effect differ in commodity-exporting and 
commodity-importing countries? And, (iii) Does the real interest rate can influence the 
relationship between commodity price volatility and the government’s fiscal balance? 
As fiscal balance decreases due to the commodity price volatility, governments borrow 
money from international financial markets, increasing the country’s external debt (Brown & 
Gibson 2006). However, external debt unsustainability may take place if the government’s 
debt/GDP becomes too large. Consequently, governments have decreased capacity to make 
debt repayments, which increases the probability of them becoming debt defaulters (Pattillo, 
                                                          
2 For example, oil revenue constitutes more than 90% of total revenue in Venezuela, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.  
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Poirson & Ricci 2002). Therefore, Chapter 3 of this dissertation explores the impact of 
commodity price volatility on external debt accumulation. 
In addition, Chapter 3 explores the impact of commodity price volatility on external 
debt accumulation under alternative exchange rate regimes. Our hypothesis is that external debt 
increases with commodity price volatility under a fixed exchange rate regime. This is because 
such a regime does not allow immediate currency adjustments with commodity price changes. 
To keep the value of currency fixed, CBs purchase domestic currency and sell foreign 
currencies. This monetary contraction decreases the real output, increases fiscal deficit and, 
ultimately, increases external debt. Conversely, a floating exchange rate regime assists the 
economic stability of a country by responding to commodity price shocks through exchange 
rate adjustments. We classify the countries as fixed, managed floating and freely floating 
exchange rate regimes based on the exchange rate classification of Reinhart, Ilzetzki and 
Rogoff (2009). Therefore, we examine the following research questions in Chapter 3:  
Research questions for Chapter 3: (i) Does external debt increase with commodity 
price volatility? (ii) Does this effect differ between commodity-exporting and importing 
countries? And, (iii) Do different exchange rate regimes play a significant role in external debt 
accumulation? 
In addition to the commodity price volatility, the literature identifies some other factors 
responsible for lower economic growth in resource-abundant countries, for example, poor 
institutional quality, political rent-seeking, lack of diversification. However, several other 
factors remain unexplored. In Chapter 4 of this dissertation, we examine whether a country’s 
trade openness may function as a potential channel to influence the resource curse. Our 
hypothesis is that trade openness reduces the effects of the curse by more efficiently 
reallocating resources. Therefore, the research question considered in Chapter 4 is: 
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Research question for Chapter 4: Does trade openness help reduce the oil curse? 
In addition, Chapter 4 investigates the role of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
increasing international trade that reduces the resource curse. To consider this, we split our 
sample period into two subsample periods, that is: 1980–1994 (pre-WTO) and 1995–2017 
(post-WTO).  
Overall, this dissertation aims to provide a deeper understanding of the relationship 
between commodity prices and the macroeconomy. In all three main chapters, we investigate 
this relationship and provide empirical evidence of three different policy options to reduce the 
adverse impact of commodity abundance. Therefore, this study contributes to the literature 





Commodity Price Volatility, Fiscal Balance and Real Interest Rate 
 
2.1. Introduction 
According to Bellemare, Barrett and Just (2013), Dwyer, Gardner and Williams (2011), Tujula 
and Wolswijk (2004) and Dehn (2000), commodity price volatility generates uncertainty in the 
economy, delays stability in government and private budgets, undermines the predictability of 
economic planning and potentially contributes to lower economic growth. In terms of 
governments’ fiscal positions, commodity-exporting countries generally rely on commodity 
royalties. Fiscal positions in commodity-importing countries may also be affected, as some 
countries tax commodity imports heavily. Following Alley (2016), Spatafora and Samake 
(2012), Kaminsky (2010), and Tujula and Wolswijk (2004), we use fiscal balance as a measure 
of government’s fiscal policy.  
Fiscal balance is a sound representation of the government’s fiscal policy because 
governments express annual targets as a flow term (e.g., balance or deficit), not in a static 
term, such as debt (Tujula & Wolswijk 2004). In this study, we define government’s fiscal 
balance as the ratio between net lending and net borrowing. Fiscal balance improves when 
net lending is over net borrowing that means government is a lender or less indebtness. In 
other words, the measure of fiscal balance referring to the change in the stock of 
government’s debt.  
Our study explores the impact of commodity price volatility on fiscal balance for 108 
countries in a panel data framework from 1993 to 2018. The countries and periods included are 
selected based on data availability from the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). In addition, this study examines the role of real interest rate in influencing the 
relationship between commodity price volatility and government’s fiscal balance. 
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Although considerable literature examines the relationship between the macroeconomy 
and commodity price volatility, there has been little consideration of commodity price volatility 
and fiscal position. To investigate these issues, this paper aims to undertake an empirical 
analysis of the relationship between commodity price volatility and fiscal balance by exploring 
the following research questions:  
(i) How does commodity price volatility affect government’s fiscal balance?  
(ii)  Are these effects different for commodity-exporting and commodity-importing 
countries?  
(iii) How do real interest rates affect the nexus between commodity price volatility 
and fiscal balance? And, 
(iv) Does this impact differ between disaggregated commodities? 
In this study, we first estimate the impact of commodity price volatility on fiscal balance 
for all 108 countries. The sample countries are then divided into two subgroups—commodity-
exporting and commodity-importing countries—to examine how the impact of commodity 
price volatility differs according to the level of commodity endowments.3 This study also 
examines the effect of the 10 most-traded commodities’ price volatilities on fiscal balance to 
examine the hypothesis that different commodity groups affect fiscal balance differently.4  
In this study, we also examine the impact of real interest rates in reducing the negative 
impact of commodity price volatility on fiscal balance. Our hypothesis is that a lower real 
interest rate helps to decrease the adverse impact of commodity price volatility on fiscal 
balance. In periods of high commodity price volatility, CBs can reduce the nominal interest 
                                                          
3 We select commodity-exporting countries by following Cavalcanti, Mohaddes and Raissi (2012), who classified 
countries as commodity exporters if the primary commodity constitutes more than 50 per cent of the country’s 
total exports.  
4 The top 10 traded commodities are: crude oil, steel, soybean, iron ore, maize, gold, copper, aluminium, silver 
and gas.  
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rate to stimulate investments. Under the sticky-price assumption, this stimulates a 
corresponding decrease in the real interest rate. With lower real interest rates, firms find it less 
expensive to borrow to purchase capital equipment that boosts investment and increases 
aggregate demand. Therefore, a government may collect additional taxes to increase 
government revenues and, eventually, fiscal balance improves. 
A dynamic panel data regression model is used in this study to explore the impact of 
commodity price volatility on fiscal balance.5 Our empirical findings show that fiscal balance 
deteriorates with commodity price volatility in both the full sample and commodity-exporting 
countries. However, we do not find any statistically significant effect in commodity-importing 
countries. The empirical results also show that fiscal balance deteriorates with an increased real 
interest rate. The negative impact of commodity price volatility on fiscal balance also increases 
with a higher real interest rate.  
This study relates to two strands in the existing literature. First, the literature addresses 
the nexus between commodity prices and fiscal balance. In the commodity-exporting countries, 
fiscal balance improves with an increase in commodity prices, as explained by Bleaney and 
Halland (2016), Murphy, Villafuerte and Ossowski (2010), Sinnott (2009), Kumah and Matovu 
(2007) and Böwer, Geis and Winkler (2007). Conversely, Spatafora and Samake (2012), 
Medina (2010) and Kaminsky (2010) argue that fiscal balance deteriorates with increased 
commodity prices. Here, we explore the impact of commodity price volatility on government’s 
fiscal balance along with commodity price changes.  
Second, this study is related to monetary policy literature. A higher real interest rate 
increases the cost of borrowing, which leads to lower investment (Malawi & Bader 2010) and 
                                                          
5 Panel data allows the inclusion of data for N cross-sections and T time periods (Asteriou & Hall 2015). The 
combined panel data matrix set consists of a time series for each cross-sectional member in the data set and offer 
a variety of estimation methods. In this study, we have data for 108 countries and the time period is 26 years. 
Hence, a panel framework is an appropriate representation for this study.  
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higher unemployment (Doğrul & Soytas 2010). Higher interest rates increase the value of 
currency (currency appreciation), making domestic exports less competitive in the international 
market; therefore, government export revenue decreases with interest rate hikes.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature. The methodology of 
this study is described in Section 2.3. We describe the data and variables in Section 2.4, and 
Section 2.5 presents the empirical results from panel data estimation. Finally, Section 2.6 
provides the conclusion and directions for future study. 
2.2. Literature review 
The literature on the impact of commodity prices on fiscal balance is extensive; however, the 
effect of commodity price volatility remains unexplored. Kumah and Matovu (2007) find that 
fiscal balance improves in response to positive commodity price shocks in commodity-
exporting countries. Similarly, using a panel regression model, Bleaney and Halland (2016), 
Murphy, Villafuerte and Ossowski (2010), Sinnott (2009), and Böwer, Geis and Winkler (2007) 
also find that government’s fiscal balance in commodity-exporting countries improves with 
rising commodity prices. 
Similarly, Céspedes and Velasco (2014) report that fiscal balance improves over time 
in commodity-exporting countries. In the 1970s commodity price boom, on average, fiscal 
balance increased by 0.03 per cent of GDP; in the 2000s, fiscal balance increased by 0.11 per 
cent of GDP. However, Spatafora and Samake (2012) and Kaminsky (2010) find that fiscal 
balance deteriorates in commodity-exporting countries. This implies that positive commodity 
price shocks may lead to strongly procyclical fiscal policies in these countries. However, 
10 
 
according to Keynesian theory and Barro’s tax smoothing models, fiscal policy should be 
countercyclical.6 
To explain procyclical behaviour, Talvi and Vegh (2005), Lane (2003), and Tornell and 
Velasco (2000) describe ‘political distortion’, which emerges due to the ‘voracity effect’.7 As 
a result of this effect, government spends more to achieve balance among the sectors of the 
country. Conversely, Duncan (2014) and Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008) claim that 
‘political rent’ or ‘rent-seeking’ activities are responsible for the political distortion. During 
boom times, voters in the commodity-abundant countries demand immediate benefits in the 
form of public goods or lower tax rates. They fear that corrupt governments may spend extra 
revenue as ‘political rent’ or ‘rent-seeking’.8 To fulfill voters’ demands, corrupt governments 
cannot accumulate additional income from a commodity windfall and thus, increase spending 
to satisfy voters to avoid becoming unpopular and losing power.9 These studies only focused 
on commodity prices changes and did not consider commodity price volatility. 
Some literature documents the response of fiscal positions to the output cycle rather 
than directly linking to commodity price cycles, that is, they indirectly link commodity price 
fluctuations to fiscal outcomes. These studies only examine the impact of commodity prices 
through their possible effects on GDP. According to Ilzetzki and Végh (2008), Talvi and Vegh 
(2005), Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004), and Gavin et al. (1996) commodity-exporting 
countries follow procyclical fiscal policy, especially during periods of low growth. However, 
                                                          
6 Countercyclical fiscal policy indicates that governments should decrease spending during the ‘good times’ and 
increase during ‘bad times’. Conversely, pro-cyclical fiscal policy means that governments increase expenditure 
during ‘good times’ and decrease during ‘bad times’.  
7 The voracity effect indicates that there exists a competition for funds among different units of the governments, 
such as ministries, provinces, et cetera. Governments deviate from the tax-smoothing model and are unable to run 
surpluses due to political distortions. 
8 In the theory, rent-seeking may be defined as any government, individual or group of people seek to increase 
their share of existing wealth without creating new wealth.  
9  Frankel (2011) argues that governments start investment in infrastructure and increase the salary of the 
government employees during the upturns.   
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this literature does not focus on the direct impact of commodity price volatility on fiscal 
positions.  
We argue that this omission may have serious consequences for commodity-exporting 
countries because increased revenue originates mainly from commodity prices rather than from 
the output cycle. Woo (2003), De Haan, Sturm and Beekhuis (1999), Alesina and Perotti (1999), 
Roubini (1991), Edin and Ohlsson (1991), and Roubini and Sachs (1989) focus on the 
economic, political and institutional determinants of fiscal balance and do not consider 
commodity prices a determinant. 
From the above discussion, it is clear that there is a lack of analysis on the impact of 
commodity price volatility on fiscal position. This study aims to fill the gap by studying the 
impact of commodity price volatility on fiscal balance. We use the most recent data available 
(up to 2018), which captures the effect of the recent global financial crisis (GFC) in 2007−2009 
and the European debt crisis. Therefore, this study will be a valuable addition to the existing 
literature.  
2.3. Methodology 
To explore the impact of commodity price volatility on the fiscal balance, this study employs 
three dynamic panel data estimation models: (i) pooled ordinary least square (pooled OLS); (ii) 
fixed-effect (FE) and (iii) random effect (RE) models, which are commonly used in the 
literature.10 In this section, we describe the FE model and apply it as the baseline model, as the 
Hausman test suggests that this model is appropriate for this study. The two remaining models 
(pooled OLS and RE) are used for robustness and descriptions of their use are presented in 
Appendix 2.2. 
                                                          
10 We do not use period fixed effect models, period random effect models and combine effects (both cross-section 
and period fixed) models because commodity price data is fixed in cross-section levels. We mainly use EViews 
9.5 version software for the data analysis and models estimation throughout the thesis. 
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2.3.1. Fixed-effect (FE) model 
The FE model essentially captures all effects that are specific to a country and that do not vary 
over time. This means that the model controls for unobserved heterogeneity when it remains 
constant over time and is correlated with all dependent and independent variables. For example, 
fiscal balance, GDP, capital, real interest rate and military expenses will vary between countries 
due to their different geographies, natural endowments, political and cultural systems and other 
basic factors that vary between countries, but not overtime. To explore the impact of 
commodity price volatility on fiscal balance, we estimate the following model: 
𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0𝑖 +   𝛽1𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽3𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 +𝛽8𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +  Ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                                                         (2.1) 
Where  𝛽0𝑖  is the unobserved time-invariant individual effect. 𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 is the fiscal balance 
(% of GDP) whereas 𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 represents the lag in fiscal balance (% of GDP). 𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 represents 
commodity price volatility and 𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 indicates the percentage change in commodity prices. 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡  and 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 represent capital growth (annual %) and GDP per capita growth (annual %), 
respectively. 𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡  and 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡  indicate military expense (% of GDP) and real interest rate 
(annual %), respectively. Comprehensive descriptions of the data and details about the sources 
of all variables are presented in Table A 2.1 in Appendix 2.1.  
The subscripts i and t denote the country and time period, respectively. The 
idiosyncratic disturbance term is denoted by Ɛ𝑖,𝑡. By using lag dependent variable, we capture 
autocorrelation in the model. In this study, we also include an interaction term in equation (2.1), 
denoted by 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡, to examine the hypothesis that a lower real interest rate reduces the 
negative impact of commodity price volatility on fiscal balance.   
Fiscal balance (𝑭𝑩𝒊,𝒕): A wide variety of fiscal measures is available, including deficits 
and debts, and nominal or cyclically adjusted data. Fiscal balance is a sound representation of 
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the government’s fiscal policy because governments express annual targets as a flow term (e.g., 
balance or deficit), not in a static term, such as debt (Tujula & Wolswijk 2004). 
Lagged Fiscal balance ( 𝑭𝑩𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 ): We include the lagged fiscal balance as an 
influencing variable to correct past budgetary imbalances. A significant change in budget 
deficits in the past may induce governments to absorb part of the recent increases. Changes in 
fiscal balance may also result from budgetary inertia, meaning that previous fiscal policy 
decisions, such as the implementation of tax reforms and significant spending reforms, can 
affect public finances in the following years. As a result, it is expected a positive sign in this 
variable. 
Commodity price volatility (𝑪𝑷𝑽𝒊,𝒕 ): According to Prebisch (1962), Cuddington, 
Ludema and Jayasuria (2002), Jacks, O’Rourke and Williamson (2011) and others, primary 
commodity prices are more volatile than those of manufactured goods and services. In 
particular, after the recent GFC in 2007–2009, commodity price volatility increased 
considerably (Omojolaibi & Egwaikhide 2014). As a result, government revenue tends to be 
more volatile—along with government spending and the fiscal balance. Therefore, we  expect 
a negative (-) sign in this variable. 
Percentage change in commodity prices (𝑷𝑪𝑪𝑷𝒊,𝒕): It is expected that commodity 
prices positively affect fiscal balance in commodity-exporting countries because government 
finance is heavily dependent on the revenue of primary commodity exports. During boom 
periods, tax formulae dictate that profits are subject to higher marginal tax rates. Similarly, 
during difficult times, government may lower the tax burden on the natural resource sector. A 
commodity-importing country’s fiscal balance is also influenced by the commodity prices 
through the trade tax. It is expected a positive (+) sign in this variable. We expect a positive 
relation between fiscal balance and commodity price changes.  
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Capital growth (𝑪𝑨𝑷𝒊,𝒕): Capital formation is an important element of fiscal balance. 
Capital growth improves economic growth and prosperity (Milesi-Ferretti & Moriyama 2006), 
which increase investment and employment in the economy. Fiscal balance increases with 
rising tax revenues and decreased government expenditure on social benefits. Eventually, 
government fiscal balance increases with the increased capital growth. Therefore, we expect a 
positive (+) sign of this vaiable.  
GDP growth per capita (𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑬𝑹𝒊,𝒕): It is expected that government fiscal balance 
increases with increased GDP per capita growth. Tax payable citizens pay more taxes with 
higher per capita income. Therefore, government’s tax revenue increases in line with fiscal 
balance. Therefore, we expect a positive (+) sign of this vaiable.  
Military expense (𝑳𝑴𝒊,𝒕): According to Cappelen, Gleditsch and Bjerkholt (1984), 
increased military expenditure reduces economic growth. As this expenditure increases, so 
does total government expenditure, leading to higher tax rates in the private sector, which 
ultimately reduce private investment and eventually decrease the fiscal balance. It is expected 
that there is a negative (-) sign in this variable. 
Real interest rate (𝑹𝑰𝑹𝒊,𝒕): A higher real interest rate causes lower investment in the 
economy that leads to a lower government tax revenue and eventually lower fiscal balance. 
According to the Comley, Anthony and Ferguson (2002) high real interest rate decrease the 
capital stock that causes lower output and investment. Therfore, it is expected a negative (-) 
relationship between fiscal balance and higher real interest rate. 
Using equation (2.1), we use estimates for the different groups of countries—(i) full 
sample, (ii) commodity-exporting and (iii) commodity-importing countries—to examine the 
hypothesis that the impact of commodity price volatility differs with the level of commodity 
endowments. By using equation (2.1), we also examine the impact of the 10 most-traded 
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commodities to test the hypothesis that the price volatility of various commodities affects fiscal 
balance differently.  
2.4. Data and description of the variables  
2.4.1. The data  
To estimate the models, this study uses an unbalanced annual panel data dataset for 108 
countries for the period 1993 to 2018.11 The data for fiscal balance are collected from the World 
Economic Outlook (WEO), IMF. Other variables such as capital growth, GDP per capita 
growth, military expense, and real interest rate are obtained from the World Development 
Indicator (WDI), WB.  
Data for commodity prices are obtained from the IMF primary commodity price data 
portal. We convert the data into the annual form by taking the average of monthly data. 
Commodity prices are expressed as an index using a 2016 base year, including both fuel and 
non-fuel price indices. The data for 10 most-traded commodities are collected from the same 
source. We estimate commodity price volatility from the commodity price index using the 
standard deviation.  
Volatility is the degree of variation of a trading price series over time. Following 
Mondal and Khanam (2018), Arezki et al. (2014), and Aghion et al. (2009) this study uses 
standard deviation as a measure of the volatility of commodity price.12 The advantage of this 
method is its simplicity: it does not depend on the unit of measurement. The literature includes 
other methods to estimate commodity price volatility. For example, Gilbert and Morgan (2010) 
apply the GARCH (Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity) model, which 
is often used for modeling volatility in financial markets (Huchet-Bourdon 2011). The model 
                                                          
11 List of full sample (108) and commodity-expoting and commodity-importing countries are presented in Tables 
A 2.2 and A 2.3 in Appendix 2.1, respectively.  
12 Arezki et al. (2014) and Aghion et al. (2009) use standard deviation to estimate exchange rate volatility, and 
Mondal and Khanam (2018) use to calculate consumption volatility. 
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is based on the concept of estimating the conditional variance of innovation from the 
autoregressive process followed by a time series.  
However, the main drawback of the GARCH approach is that the empirical results are 
dependent on the sampling frequency (Engle & Patton 2001). If a GARCH model is correctly 
specified for one frequency of data, then it will be misspecified for data with different time 
scales. Matthews (2010) use ‘de-trend’ as a measure of volatility. However, volatility 
measurement with this model may depend on the choice of the de-trending technique and thus, 
the estimation results may vary between models. We estimate commodity price volatility using 
monthly data to capture monthly price variation.13 This overcomes the potential problem that 
the volatility occurs in the middle of the year such that the variation is hidden in the annual 
data. Commodity price volatility for each year is calculated by using standard deviation, 




𝜏=1                                                  (2.2) 
where, σt = commodity prices volatility at time t, Pτ = observed monthly prices, µt = average 
price (𝜇𝑡= (1/12) ∑ 𝑃𝜏
12
𝜏=1 ) , and τ = months (1, 2, 3 … 12)    
Figure 2.1: Commodity price volatility 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on IMF (2019) 
                                                          
13 For example, with monthly data, the commodity price volatility in 2016 is computed as the commodity price 














Figure 2.1 shows a significant spike in commodity price volatility during the GFC 
period of 2007–2009. From Figure 2.1, we also observe that in the pre-GFC periods (i.e., from 
the early-1990s to the mid-2000s), commodity price volatility was low, reflecting the period 
referred to as the ‘Great Moderation’.14 
We calculate the percentage change in commodity price as follows: 
                                           𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑡 =  
𝑃𝑡2− 𝑃𝑡1
𝑃𝑡1
 𝑋 100                                                         (2.3) 
Where 𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑡 = percentage change in commodity price, 𝑃𝑡1 = commodity prices at 
time 𝑡1 and 𝑃𝑡2 = commodity prices at time 𝑡2. 
2.4.2. Unit root test, descriptive statistics and normality test 
We use the Augmented Ducky-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) tests to evaluate the 
stationary properties of all variables. The stationary variable is characterised by having a 
constant mean and variance over time, and the covariance between two values in the series 
depends on the length of time between the two values, but not on the actual times when the 
value is observed. Apart from commodity prices, all other variables included in the model are 
stationary at ρ = 0.05. However, the ρ-value of commodity prices is greater than 0.05, 
indicating that it is not stationary. To make this series stationary, we use the percentage change 
of the series. We present the unit root test, descriptive statistics and correlation matrix in 




                                                          
14 “Great Moderation” refers to a reduction in the volatility of business cycle fluctuations starting in the mid–
1980s. Bernanke (2004) hypothesize three potential causes for this economic stability: structural change in the 
economy, improved economic policy and good luck.  
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2.5. Results and discussion 
In this section, we describe all empirical results estimated by FE model for all countries in the 
sample, and for commodity-exporting and commodity-importing countries. The result of the 
Hausman test indicates that the FE model fits the data in this study better than the RE model.15  
2.5.1. Results for different country groups (full sample, commodity-exporting and 
commodity-importing countries) 
Table 2.1 shows the results of the estimation of equation 2.1. In this section, we discuss the 
coefficients of the variables of interest (i.e., commodity price volatility, commodity price 
growth, real interest rate and the interaction term between commodity price volatility and real 
interest rate) estimated with the FE model. Coefficients of all other variables are consistent 
with literature. Columns 1, 2 and 3 in Table 2.1 represent the pooled  OLS, FE and RE models, 
respectively. As shown in column 2, the coefficient on the commodity price volatility is 
negative (–0.04), indicating that governments’ fiscal balance deteriorates with commodity 
price volatility in all countries in the sample. All being equal, a one standard deviation increase 
in commodity price volatility is associated with a significant deteriorate in fiscal balance of 
over –0.04 units as a share of GDP. The results are consistent across all three panel data 
estimation models (columns 1-3) and are statistically significant at the 1% level.16 
Simultaneously, the positive coefficient of commodity price changes is 0.03, which 
indicates that governments’ fiscal balance improves with rising commodity prices. If the other 
variables remain unchanged, a one-unit increase in commodity prices is associated with a fiscal 
balance improve of over 0.03 units (see Table 2.1, column 2). This implies that governments 
                                                          
15 Hausman test results are presented in Appendix Table A 2.2.1. 
16 Given that the constant term is not that informative in the Pooled ordinary least square, and fixed effect and 




do accrue additional revenues from the commodity prices windfall. The results are consistent 
across all three panel data estimation models and are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Table 2.1: Determinants of fiscal balance (full sample) 
 Dependent variable: 𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 














































































R2 0.50 0.57 0.50 
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.54 0.50 
Periods 26 26 26 
Countries 108 108 108 
Observations 1937 1937 1937 
Note: Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in brackets. The asterisks ***, ** and * 
indicate the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Cluster standard errors are presented in square 
brackets. 
The negative coefficient of the real interest rate indicates that fiscal balance deteriorates 
with an increase of the real interest rate. This result is consistent with the view of Comley, 
Anthony and Ferguson (2002) that a higher real interest rate causes lower capital stock and 
lower output due to reduced investment levels, resulting in lower fiscal balance. The coefficient 
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of the interaction term between commodity price volatility and real interest rate is also negative, 
indicating that the negative impact of commodity price volatility on fiscal balance increases 
with an increase in real interest rates. These results are statistically significant at the 1% level 
and consistent with all three models. The growth impact of a marginal increase in real interest 
rate implied from equation 2.1 is: 
                             
𝑑(𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡)
𝑑(𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 )
 = − 0.04 −  0.004 (𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)   
The adverse impact of commodity price volatility on fiscal balance increases with 
higher real interest rates. The coefficient of commodity price volatility is –0.04 but when the 
value of the interaction term is added, the value of the coefficient increases in absolute term: 
(−0.04 −  0.004 =  | −  0.044 | >  | − 0.04|). 
Table 2.2 shows results for the determinants of fiscal balance in the commodity-
exporting and commodity-importing countries with pooled OLS, FE and RE models. The 
estimated coefficient for commodity price volatility is –0.07 in commodity-exporting countries 
(refer to column 2), which is higher than the full sample (see column 2 in Table 2.1), indicating 
that commodity price volatility has a larger impact in commodity-exporting countries. While 
these results are statistically significant at the 1% level those for commodity-importing 
countries are statistically insignificant (columns 4, 5 and 6).  
Table 2.2 shows that the negative impact of commodity price volatility on fiscal balance 
increases with the increased real interest rates in commodity-exporting countries (column 2). 
This result is statistically significant at the 1% level. In general, commodity-exporting countries 
require a large amount of capital to extract commodities (e.g., oil, gas, metals). Therefore, a 
higher real interest rate increases the cost of borrowing capital, which dampens investment and 
outputs. Consequently, government revenue and fiscal balance decrease with a higher real 
interest rate in those countries. However, in commodity-importing countries, we do not find 
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any statistically significant influence of real interest rate on the relationship between 
commodity price volatility and fiscal balance with the FE model (column 5 in Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2: Determinants of fiscal balance (commodity exporting and importing countries) 
 Dependent variable: 𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 































































































































































R2 0.54 0.60 0.54 0.48 0.55 0.48 
Adjusted R2 0.54 0.57 0.53 0.48 0.53 0.48 
Periods 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Countries 45 45 45 63 63 63 
Observations 806 806 806 1131 1131 1131 
Note: Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in brackets. The asterisks ***, ** and * 
indicate the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Cluster standard errors are presented in square 
brackets. 
Overall, government fiscal balance decreases with the increase in commodity price 
volatility in all countries in the sample and is particularly stronger for commodity-exporting 
countries. However, this impact is not statistically significant in commodity-importing 
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countries. The results also imply that lower real interest rates decrease the adverse effect of 
commodity price volatility on fiscal balance.  
2.5.2. Results for disaggregated commodities 
In this section, we discuss the impact of the 10 most-traded commodities’ price volatilities on 
fiscal balance. Tables 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 present the empirical results for the full sample, 
commodity-exporting and commodity-importing countries, respectively.  
With few exceptions (i.e., maize, aluminium, coper and gas) the coefficients of all the 
other commodities’ price volatilities are statistically significant and negative for the full sample 
(see Table 2.3). The estimated coefficient is larger in the case of metal commodities than energy 
and food commodity groups. One plausible reason for this is that metal price fluctuations over 
the last 150 years are characterised by three major super-cycles, which lasted between 20 and 
70 years and the fourth super cycle is assumed to be underway (Jerrett & Cuddington 2008).  
Among the energy prices, we find that the coefficient of oil price volatility is negative 
and statistically significant. Oil is considered a vital input in the production process and its 
price is more volatile than that of any other energy commodity (Rafiq, Salim & Bloch 2009). 
Regnier (2007) estimates that the crude oil price is 95% more volatile than other energy 
commodities because of its global demand and supply equilibrium. Among the food 
commodities, soybean price volatility is negative and statistically significant. One probable 
reason is that soybean is used to make different food (e.g., soybean oil and meat and dairy 
substitutes, including tofu and soy milk) and agricultural items (animal feed and biodiesel).  
In Table 2.3, the interaction term is negative and statistically significant in the case of 
oil, steel, soybean, iron ore, silver, aluminium, coper and gas, indicating that a higher real 
interest rate increases the negative impact of these commodities’ price volatility on fiscal 
balance. A higher interest rate increases the cost of capital, which decreases the fiscal balance. 
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For different primary commodities, investment requirements are different; for some, a large 
amount of capital and/or longer-term investments are required. For example, the investment 
time horizon for the oil industry is 5–7 years. Thus, with the lower interest rate, investors may 
earn increased revenue and pay more taxes to improve the fiscal balance.  
From Table 2.4, we observe a similar pattern of results in commodity-exporting 
countries, except in the case of steel, iron ore, silver and soybean, where the coefficients are 
larger than those of the full sample. In the case of other commodities, the size of the coefficient 
is the same. From Table 2.5, we observe that some metal commodities’ (steel, and iron ore) 
price volatilities have a statistically significant effect on fiscal balance. However, we do not 
find any statistically significant impact due to energy price volatility.  
From the above discussion, we can conclude that the most-traded disaggregated 
commodities’ price volatilities have a statistically significant negative impact on fiscal 
balance—and metal commodity price volatility has a larger impact than that of other 
commodity groups. A higher real interest rate increases the adverse effects of commodity price 
volatility on fiscal balance. 
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Table 2.3: Determinants of fiscal balance (full sample) 
 Dependent variable: 𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 




































































































































































































































































R2 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.56 
Adjusted R2 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 
Periods 38 32 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 26 
Countries 108 106 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 
Observations 2057 1531 2057 2057 2057 2057 2057 2057 2057 1937 
Note: Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in brackets. The asterisks ***, ** and * indicate the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Cluster standard errors are presented in square brackets. 
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Table 2.4: Determinants of fiscal balance (commodity-exporting countries) 
 Dependent variable: 𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 

















































































































































































































































R2 0.59 0.60 0.56 0.59 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.58 
Adjusted R2 0.56 0.56 0.54 0.56 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 
Periods 36 30 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 26 
Countries 45 44 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations 839 617 839 839 839 839 839 839 839 806 
Note: Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in brackets. The asterisks ***, ** and * indicate the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Cluster standard errors are presented in square brackets. 
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Table 2.5: Determinants of fiscal balance (commodity-importing countries) 
 Dependent variable: 𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 
















































































































































































































































R2 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.57 
Adjusted R2 0.54 0.51 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.55 
Periods 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Countries 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 
Observations 1218 1218 1218 1218 1218 1218 1218 1218 1218 1218 
Note: Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in brackets. The asterisks ***, ** and * indicate the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Cluster standard errors are presented in square brackets. 
27 
2.5.3. Marginal effect 
Marginal effect measures the instantaneous rate of change in continuous variables. Marginal 
effect estimation provides a sound estimate of the degree of change in the dependent variable 
that will be produced by variation in the independent variables. In this study, we compute the 
marginal effect of commodity price volatility on fiscal balance in terms of real interest rates. 
Based on the estimates in Table 2.1, this produced: 
                                   
𝑑(𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡)
𝑑(𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡)
=  − 0.04 −  0.004 (𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)                               (2.4) 
From equation 2.4, we can see that the marginal effect of commodity price volatility on 




, on the Y-axis and real interest rates on the X-axis.17 From figure 2.2a, we can 
observe that the marginal effect of commodity price volatility on fiscal balance becomes 
negative with the increase of real interest rate  that supports our empirical findings in Table 2.1. 
Figure 2.2a: Marginal effect of commodity price volatility on fiscal balance (full 
sample) 
 
                                                          
17 Marginal effect of the 10 most-traded commodity price volatilities are presented in Appendix 2.3. 
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Figure 2.2b: Marginal effect of commodity price volatility on fiscal balance 
(commodity-exporting) 
 





This study explores the impact of commodity price volatility on fiscal balance. To understand 
its effect, a dynamic panel data regression model is estimated for 108 countries for the period 
from 1993 to 2018. Our empirical findings show that commodity price volatility has a negative 
and statistically significant effect on fiscal balance in the full sample and commodity-exporting 
countries. However, we do not find any statistically significant impact on commodity-
importing countries.  
This study also investigates the role of real interest rates in influencing the relationship 
between commodity price volatility and fiscal balance. Our empirical results indicate that the 
negative impact of commodity price volatility increases with increased real interest rates. A 
higher real interest rate increases the cost of borrowing, which decreases investment. Based on 
our empirical findings, we conclude that the adoption of a lower real interest rate will help to 
reduce the adverse effects of commodity price volatility on fiscal balance.  
This study can be extended by identifying the effect of positive and negative volatility 
of commodity price on the government fiscal balance (asymmetric) using the Markov-








The increased external debt after the GFC renewed interest in the pervasiveness of sovereign 
debt sustainability.18 This issue is particularly important for commodity-abundant economies. 
In general, commodity prices are an important driver of fiscal policy and business cycles in 
these countries.19 Given their dependence on highly volatile revenue sources, these economies 
face a significant challenge in achieving fiscal balance.20 Therefore, persistent fiscal deficit 
leads to an increase in external debt. This study explores the impact of commodity price 
volatility on external debt for 97 countries in a panel dataset from the period 1993 to 2016, 
subject to data availability from the WB and IMF.21 Further, this study examines the role of 
alternative exchange rate regimes in influencing the impact of commodity price volatility on 
external debt accumulation. 
Commodity price shocks can create a dilemma for countries when fiscal revenue largely 
depends on commodities. The risk being that revenue boosted by high commodity prices 
translate into long-lasting expenditure increasing external debt. For example, Algeria, Nigeria 
and Venezuela fell prey to over-optimistic spending habits during the 1970s commodity booms, 
using current and expected revenues to finance different development projects (Brown, 
                                                          
18 External debt in low- and middle-income countries reached $7.1 trillion in 2017 from $3.6 trillion in 2008.  
19 For empirical evidence, see Céspedes and Velasco (2014), Spatafora and Samake (2012) and Medina (2010).  
20 For example, oil revenue constitutes more than 90% of total revenue in Venezuela, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.  
21 In this study, we use total external debt stocks (% of gross national income) which is a debt owed to non-
residents repayable in currency, goods, or services. Usually, government starts borrowing from internal and 
external sources when fiscal deficit increases. This study aims to explore how commodity price volatility affects 
the debt that is borrowed from foreign sources only because sovereign debt crisis issue arises due to the higher 
external debt. Therefore, government debt especially external debt arises due to the decrease in fiscal balance 
however these two are not a similar measure.  
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Crawford & Gibson 2008). Such projects became unsustainable when commodity prices 
declined and volatility increased. As the fiscal deficit increases, governments borrow money 
from international financial markets, which increases the country’s government debt (Brown 
& Gibson 2006). In general, borrowing money helps to increase in economic growth rates by 
reducing the gap between domestic saving and investment. However, external debt 
sustainability may deteriorate if debt/GDP ratio becomes too large. Consequently, governments 
face a decreased capacity to make debt repayments and the probability of defaulting increases 
(Pattillo, Poirson & Ricci 2002). 
Commodity prices are by nature more volatile than the prices of manufactured goods 
[see e.g., Radetzki and Wårell (2016), Jacks, O’Rourke and Williamson (2011) and Szirmai 
(2005)], making export revenue highly volatile, especially in commodity-exporting countries.22 
In this study, we select commodity-exporting countries following Cavalcanti, Mohaddes and 
Raissi (2012), who classified countries as commodity exporters if the primary commodity 
constitutes more than 50 per cent of the country’s total exports.  
Further, this study examines the role of different exchange rate regimes to absorb 
external shocks into the economy. We hypothesise that a fixed exchange rate regime magnifies 
the shocks, which became obvious after the Argentine currency and debt crisis in 2001–2002 
(Edwards & Yeyati 2005). Under the fixed exchange rate mechanism, economic stability is 
delayed, awaiting adjustment of nominal wages, commodity prices or an increase in volatility 
of output and employment.23 As a result, it is assumed that commodity price volatility increases 
external debt under a fixed exchange rate regime. In contrast, a floating exchange rate regime 
                                                          
22  Jacks, O’Rourke and Williamson (2011) show that since 1960 Latin American, South Asian, and African 
primary commodity exporting countries face three times higher volatility in terms of trade than manufacturing-
exporting industrial economies.  
23 Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the domestic currency is fixed to another currency or a basket of currencies. 
Whereas under a floating exchange rate regime, the nominal exchange rate is allowed to move freely in response 
to supply and demand conditions in the foreign exchange market. 
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may support the economic stability of a country by responding to commodity price shocks 
through exchange rate adjustments. In this study, we include a further classification: managed 
floating exchange rate regimes, wherein currencies can move within predetermined limits. 
Countries are classified according to the definition of Reinhart, Ilzetzki and Rogoff (2009). 
Given the considerable literature on the relationship between the macroeconomy and 
commodity price volatility, but lack of information about commodity price volatility and 
external debt. This paper aims to undertake an empirical analysis of the relationship between 
commodity prices and commodity price volatility and external debt by exploring the following 
research questions:  
(i) How does commodity price volatility affect external debt accumulation?  
(ii) Are these effects different for commodity-exporting and commodity-importing 
countries? And, 
(iii) Does the exchange rate regime matter for government debt accumulation in 
different country groups? 
A dynamic panel data regression model is used in this study to explore the impact of 
commodity prices and commodity price volatility on external debt in different groups of 
countries.24 The results show that there is a positive relationship between commodity price 
volatility and external debt: external debt increases with commodity price volatility in the full 
sample and commodity-exporting countries. We do not find any statistically significant impact 
of commodity price volatility on external debt in commodity-importing countries. Further, our 
empirical results show that commodity price volatility has no statistically significant impact on 
                                                          
24 Panel data usually give the researchers a large number of data points, increasing the degrees of freedom and 
reducing the collinearity among explanatory variables-hence improving the efficiency of econometric estimates 
(Hsiao 2014). Also, given the rapid changes in global macroeconomic environment in the past years, the 
application of panel data approach seems to be highly preferred, as it allows to control time-specific events that 
are linked to overseas borrowing (Waheed 2017). 
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external debt in countries that use a floating exchange rate regime. In contrast, external debt 
increases with commodity price volatility in countries with more rigid exchange rate regimes.  
This study relates to at least two strands of existing literature. First, this study is linked 
to work on the nexus between commodity prices and external debt, which have a negative 
relationship in commodity-exporting countries [see e.g., Swaray (2005), Hausmann and Gavin 
(1995), and Olukoshi (1989)]. In this study, we explore the impact of commodity price 
volatility on external debt along with commodity price changes. 
Second, this study is related to the exchange rate regimes literature. The argument 
favors the floating exchange rate regimes established by Friedman (1953) and  Mundell (1961), 
which state that floating exchange rates can better absorb external shocks than fixed exchange 
rates. This is because during the external shocks, floating exchange rates allow faster 
adjustment of relative prices and quantities. Dąbrowski and Wroblewska (2016), Hoffmann 
(2007), Edwards and Yeyati (2005), Ghosh et al. (1997), Flood and Rose (1995), and Baxter 
and Stockman (1989) empirically find that floating exchange rates can absorb external shocks 
faster than fixed rates. In contrast, Masson, Goldstein and  Frenkel (1991), Aghevli, Khan and 
Montiel (1991) and Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) argue that a fixed exchange rate provides more 
fiscal discipline in light of the lax fiscal policies in developing countries.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature. In Section 3.3, we 
describe the movements in commodity price volatility and external debt. In Section 3.4, we 
present the theory of the nexus between external shocks and exchange rate regimes. The 
methodology of this study is described in Section 3.5. We then describe the data and variables 
in Section 3.6 and Section 3.7 presents the empirical results from panel data estimation. Finally, 
Section 3.8 provides the conclusion and offers directions for future study. 
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3.2. Literature review 
Lopez-Martin, Leal and Fritscher (2017), Arezki and Brückner (2012), Kamola (2007), Swaray 
(2005), among others, find a negative relationship between commodity price changes and 
government external debt burden, indicating that external debt decreases with increased 
commodity prices and vice-versa. The government can repay a portion of debt with the extra 
revenue accrued from the commodity windfalls. Conversely, Nooruddin (2008) finds that 
government debt burden increases with commodity price booms. This is due to the increase in 
government expenditure designed to expand infrastructure and improve non-commodity 
productive capacity. 
Another reason is that rapid commodity price increases encourage corrupt and rent-
seeking behaviour and exacerbate societal tensions when the distribution of commodity 
revenues is not considered equitable (Ndikumana & Boyce 2000, and Ajayi 1991).25 Further, 
the higher volatility in revenues reduces the time horizons of policy actors who feel compelled 
to spend revenues when they are available. Overall, these various effects of revenue volatility 
result in rising fiscal deficits, the financing for which governments obtain through external 
borrowing (Edo 2002). These studies only focused on the impact of commodity price on 
external debt and no attention was given to commodity price volatility.  
From a political economy perspective, Alesina and Tabellini (1990) developed a 
theoretical framework that describes the role of democracy and a coalition form of government 
in external debt accumulation. They argue that the incumbent government might burden a rival 
party coming into power with high debt to be repaid in the future. This often occurs in 
                                                          
25In public choice theory and economics, rent-seeking involves aiming to increase one’s share of existing wealth 
without creating new wealth. Rent-seeking results in reduced economic efficiency through poor allocation of 
resources, reduced actual wealth-creation and lost government revenue.  
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democratic systems where there is the uncertainty of re-election, and outgoing governments 
may deliberately undermine a new incoming government by accumulating external debt.  
Similarly, Edin and Ohlsson (1991) and Roubini and Sachs (1989) find that government 
debt increases with the coalition form of government. Further, Chiminya, Dunne and 
Nikolaidou (2018) find that democratic governments accumulate more debt from external 
sources than do autocratic governments because creditors may lend more to democratic 
institutions. Additionally, democratic governments increase spending on infrastructure and 
social safety net programs to motivate voters to vote for them again. However, this leads to the 
accumulation of more debt when compared to autocratic regimes that may not need to be voted 
into power.  
Some of the current literature documents the reaction of public debt positions to the 
output cycle rather than in direct response to commodity price cycles (i.e., only indirectly 
linking commodity price fluctuations with external debt accumulation), linking the impact of 
commodity prices only through their possible effect on GDP. According to Bittencourt (2015), 
Forslund, Lima and Panizza (2011), and Barro (1979) there is a countercyclical relationship 
between output cycles and public debt, indicating that public debt decreases with the 
development of national income. However, these studies do not focus on the direct impact of 
commodity price cycles on government debt policy. We argue that this omission may be a 
serious issue for commodity abundance countries where a significant share of revenue is from 
commodity royalties rather than from the output cycle. A summary of the most relevant 
literature concerning the determinants of government debt is presented in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Summary of the literature concerning determinants of government debt 
Author(s) Countries Periods Technique(s) Determinants  




1960–1985 pooled OLS GDP Growth, interest rate, 
unemployment, govt. types 
Colombo (2009) 61 developing 
countries 
1970–2010 pooled OLS GDP per capita, trade 
openness, education level, 
floating exchange rate, 
financial depth, IQ, inflation,  





1970–2007 FE Commodity price shocks, 
polity2 





1990–2007 pooled OLS GDP, REER 
 
Swamy (2015) 82 developing 
and developed 
countries 
1980–2009 Panel-GMM FDI, GDP growth, inflation, 







1975–2012 Pooled OLS 
and FE 
Trade openness, population, 
GDP Growth, RIR, Inflation, 
polity2,  
Lau and Lee (2016) Thailand, the 
Philippines 










Shadow economy, corruption, 
government’s expenditure  
Waheed (2017) 24 oil-exporting 
and importing 
countries 
2004–2013 pooled OLS GDP, CAB, FDI, inflation, oil 
price, expenditure 
Here, pooled OLS = Pooled ordinary least square, FE = Fixed-effects model, DOLS = Dynamic OLS model, 
GMM = Generalised method of moments model, IV = Instrumental Variables, VAR = Vector Autoregressive 
model, REER = Real Effective Exchange Rate, RIR = Real Interest Rate, CPI = Consumer Price Index. FDI = 
Foreign Direct Investment, M2 = Money Supply. 
While the effect of commodity prices on government external debt policies has been 
studied in the literature, there is a lack of analysis of the impact of commodity price volatility 
on government debt policies. We aim to fill the gap by studying the impact of commodity price 
volatility on external debt rather than focusing only on commodity prices. Moreover, this study 
examines how commodity price volatility has a different effect on the external debt depending 
on which exchange rate regime is in place. We use the most recent data available up to 2016 to 
captures the effects of the recent GFC and the European sovereign debt crisis. Therefore, this 
study will be a valuable addition to the existing literature.  
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3.3. The movement of commodity price volatility and external debt 
In this section, we discuss the movement of commodity price volatility and external debt over 
time. The primary axis, left-hand side (LHS), in Figure 3.1 shows the movement of external 
debt for all three country groups. On the secondary axis, right-hand side (RHS), we present the 
movement of commodity price volatility. From the RHS of Figure 3.1, it is observed that from 
the early-1990s to the mid–2000s, commodity price volatility was low, reflecting the period 
referred to as the ‘Great Moderation’.26 In 2007–2009 (i.e., during the GFC), a big spike was 
observed in commodity price volatility. The period after 2009 shows greater volatility than the 
pre-GFC periods.  
Figure 3.1: Movement of commodity price volatility and external debt 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on WB (2018) and IMF (2018) data. 
The LHS of Figure 3.1 presents the trend of external debt for the three country groups, 
all of which have a similar trend, though the external debt is higher in commodity-exporting 
                                                          
26 The term ‘Great Moderation’ refers to a reduction in the volatility of business cycle fluctuations starting in the 
mid–1980s. Bernanke (2004) hypothesise three potential causes for this economic stability: structural change in 
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countries.27 We also observe that during the 1980s, external debt increased continuously. The 
period of high debt in the 1980s is known as the ‘Washinton Consensus’: countries were under 
pressure to implement major policy reforms, such as opening their economies to increased trade, 
privatising state-owned firms and seeking foreign investment. The reforms were often imposed 
on developing countries as a condition for debt relief and financial support from Washington 
DC-based institutions, namely, the United States Treasury, the IMF and the WB. 
A striking feature of Figure 3.1 shows that during the Great Moderation period (low 
commodity price volatility), the external debt declines substantially, particularly in 
commodity-exporting countries. After 2008, commodity price volatility increases significantly 
in line with external debt increases. 
3.4. Theoretical background 
The impact of external shocks under different exchange rate regimes can be analysed by the 
movement of investment-savings (IS) curves that describes how the goods and money markets 
interact to balance the economy’s interest rate and output. We can explain the impact of 
commodity price volatility in an open economy under a fixed exchange rate and a floating 
exchange rate regime by using the movement of IS curve.  
3.4.1. Commodity price volatility shocks in commodity-exporting countries under the 
floating and fixed exchange rate regimes 
We can explain the mechanism of commodity price volatility shocks in commodity-exporting 
countries under the floating and fixed exchange rate using investment-savings (IS) diagrams, 
as shown in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b. 
                                                          
27 We use the average of external debt data in Figure 3.1.  
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Figure 3.2a. Shocks with floating exchange 
rate 
Figure 3.2b. Shocks with fixed exchange rate 
 
Figure 3.2a shows the effects of commodity price volatility under a floating exchange 
rate regime. Starting from the initial equilibrium point A where initial output is Y0. Commodity 
price volatility decreases investment due to the macroeconomic uncertainty.28 As a result, the 
initial IS0 curve shifts to the left at IS2. The new equilibrium point is B, where the output is Y1, 
which is lower than the previous output level at point A (Y0). At point B, the interest rate falls 
and could be lower than the world interest rate, causing capital outflow, leading to the 
depreciation of the currency under the floating exchange rate regime. As the currency 
depreciates, export expands and import falls, causing output start to rise again and the IS curve 
shifts towards its new equilibrium point at C. Therefore, floating exchange rate helps to recover 
the economy from the external shocks and therefore, country’s current account balance 
increases and external debt decreases. 
In contrast, Figure 3.2b shows the effects of commodity price volatility in the economy 
under a fixed exchange rate regime. The initial equilibrium point is A, where the country’s 
equilibrium output is Y0. The commodity price volatility causes decreases in investment and 
                                                          
28 Note that commodity price volatility in a commodity exporting country may lead to uncertainty for investors in 
all sectors related to commodities. 
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output and therefore, the IS0 curve shifts to the left as IS1. The new equilibrium point is B, 
where the output is Y1, which is lower than the previous equilibrium point A (Y0). Under the 
fixed exchange rate regime, the CB purchases the domestic currency to keep its value 
unchanged. As a result, the domestic money supply decreases. This monetary contraction 
results in a further decrease in output. Therefore, from the above two figures we can observe 
that the reduction in output is smaller under a floating exchange rate regime (Figure 3.2a) than 
a fixed exchange rate regime (Figure 3.2b) meaning that commodity price volatility causes to 
rise external debt more with a fixed exchange rate regime. In Figure 3.3, we show the flowchart 
of this theoretical explanation.  
Figure 3.3: Commodity price volatility and external debt  
a. Under a floating exchange rate regime 
 
b. Under a fixed exchange rate regime 
 
3.5. Methodology 
To explore the impact of commodity price volatility on external debt, we employ the three 
dynamic panel data estimation models discussed in Chapter 2: pooled OLS, FE and RE.29 To 
select the appropriate model from FE and RE models, we use the Hausman test. Based on the 
                                                          
29 We do not use period fixed effect models, period random effect models and combine effects (both cross-section 











































result of the Hausman test, we use the FE model as our baseline model as described in this 
section.30 
3.5.1. Fixed-effect (FE) model 
As discussed in Section 2.3.1, the FE model captures all effects that are specific to a particular 
country and that remain constant, thus controlling unobserved heterogeneity when it is constant 
over time and correlated with the independent variables. The FE model assumes that these 
unobservable factors may affect the predictor or outcome variable and thus, controls for this 
are necessary. The model removes the effect of time-invariant characteristics to allow 
assessment of the net impact of commodity price volatility on external debt accumulation. We 
estimate the following model:  
 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 +  𝛽1𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 
+𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +  Ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                                          (3.1) 
where  𝛽0𝑖  is the unobserved time-invariant individual effect. 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡  is the 
percentage change in external debt (% of GNI); 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 represents the lag in the percentage 
change in external debt (% of GNI); 𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡  indicates the commodity price volatility, while 
𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡  represents the percentage change in commodity prices. 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡, 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 and 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 represent the real interest rate (annual %), foreign direct investment (% of GDP), current 
account balance (% of GDP), and GDP per capita growth (annual %) respectively.  
Change in external debt (𝑷𝑪𝑬𝑫𝒊,𝒕): Change in external debt is our dependent variable 
and is denoted by 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 in the model. We use debt as a measure of fiscal policy because it 
is a broader measurement of government fiscal activities than the budget deficit. The 
commonly reported measures of financial balance overstate the economically relevant deficit 
                                                          
30 Results for the Hausman test are presented in Appendix Table A 3.7 in Appendix 3.2. 
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by including the inflation component of interest payments on the government debt. It would be 
more appropriate, however, if the interest component of government debt was treated as a type 
of debt repayment rather than as an item of current budgetary expenditure. The change in 
government debt automatically adjusts this component (Roubini & Sachs 1989). 
Lagged change in external debt (𝑷𝑪𝑬𝑫𝒊,𝒕−𝟏): We include the lagged value of external 
debt as an influencing variable to correct for past budgetary imbalances. A significant change 
in fiscal policy in the past may induce governments to undo part of the recent increases. 
Changes in the government debt may also result from lags or delays in effecting budgetary 
initiatives, for example, previous fiscal policy decisions, such as the implementation of tax 
reforms and significant spending reforms, can affect public finances in the following years. 
Therefore, it is expected a positive sign (+) in this variable. 
Commodity price volatility(𝑪𝑷𝑽𝒊,𝒕): Generally, primary commodity prices are more 
volatile than the prices of manufacturing goods. Following the recent global financial crisis 
(GFC) in 2007-2009, commodity price volatility increased, considerably (Omojolaibi & 
Egwaikhide 2014). Because of this volatility, government revenue tends to be more volatile – 
along with government spending. The uncertainty of future revenue from commodities and the 
variability of those revenues results in changes in the expenses as the government reassesses 
its expected revenue stream, generating significant adjustment costs. In these circumstances, 
governments try to borrow from external sources to smooth out the level of economic activities. 
As a result, it can generally be expected that commodity price volatility will increase 
government external debt. We expect a positive (+) sign in this variable. 
Change in commodity prices (𝑷𝑪𝑪𝑷𝒊,𝒕): It is expected that external debt will decrease 
with the increase in commodity prices and vice-versa. Governments can repay the debt by using 
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extra revenue accrued from the commodity price windfall, especially in the commodity-
exporting countries. Therefore, it is expected a negative (-) sign of this variable. 
Real interest rate (𝑹𝑰𝑹𝒊,𝒕): The interest rate is the price a borrower pays for the use of 
the money they borrow from a lender/financial institution or the fee paid on borrowed assets 
(Crowley 2007). It is expected that external debt increases with an increase in real interest rates 
because more money is needed to pay to the lenders. We expect a positive (+) sign for this 
variable. 
Foreign direct investment ( 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊,𝒕) : It is expected that an increase in FDI rate 
promotes economic growth that helps to reduce external debt accumulation. According to 
Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee (1998), FDI is an important vehicle for the transfer of 
technologies, knowledge and human capital, all associated with higher productivity and 
eventually decrease external debt. Therefore, the sign will be negative (-).  
Current account balance (𝑪𝑨𝑩𝒊,𝒕): It is expected that the current account balance has 
a negative impact on external debt accumulation. If a country’s balance increases indicating 
that its exports are more than imports. This encourages investment and output growth causing 
lower external debt and vice-versa. Mehta and Kayumi (2014) show there is a negative 
relationship between current account balance and external debt in India. We expect a negative 
(-) sign in this variable. 
Gross domestic product (𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒊,𝒕): It is expected that external debt decreases with the 
increase in GDP per capita. This is because with the higher per capita income people will pay 
more taxes than increase the government’s tax revenue and also decreases the government's 
expenses in the form of social benefits. Therefore, we expect a negative (-) sign in this variable. 
The subscripts i and t denote the country and period, respectively. The idiosyncratic 
disturbance term is denoted by Ɛ𝑖,𝑡 . By using lag dependent variable, we capture the 
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autocorrelation in the model. As in Chapter 2, equation (3.1) uses estimates for the different 
groups of countries (i.e., full sample, commodity-exporting and commodity-importing 
countries) to examine the hypothesis that the impact of commodity price volatility on external 
debt differs with the level of commodity endowments. 
3.6. Data and description of the variables 
3.6.1. The data 
To estimate the models, this study employs an unbalanced annual panel data dataset for 97 
countries covering the period from 1993 to 2016.31 The countries and period are included based 
on data availability. The data for external debt, foreign direct investment, real interest rate, 
current account balance and GDP per capita growth are collected from the WDI of the WB.  
The data for commodity prices are obtained from the IMF primary commodity price 
sheet. We convert the data into the annual form by taking the average of monthly data. 
Commodity prices are expressed as an index using the 2005 base price and include both fuel 
and non-fuel price indices. We estimate commodity price volatility from the commodity price 
index using the standard deviation from monthly data to capture monthly price variation.32 
Volatility is the degree of variation of a trading price series over time. Commodity price 
volatility for each year is calculated by using standard deviation, 




𝜏=1                                                  (3.2) 
where, σt = commodity prices volatility at time t, Pτ = observed monthly prices, µt = average 
price (𝜇𝑡= (1/12) ∑ 𝑃𝜏
12
𝜏=1 ) , and τ = months (1, 2, 3 … 12)    
                                                          
31 List of full sample (97) and commodity-exporting and importing countries are presented in Tables A 3.2 and A 
3.3 in Appendix 3.1, respectively. 
32 For example, with monthly data, the commodity price volatility in 2016 is computed as the commodity price 
volatility over the period from 2016:1 to 2016:12. 
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We estimate the commodity price changes as follows: 
                                           𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑡 =  
𝑃𝑡2− 𝑃𝑡1
𝑃𝑡1
 𝑋 100                                                         (3.3) 
where 𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑡= percentage changes in commodity prices, 𝑃𝑡1 = commodity prices at 
time 𝑡1 and 𝑃𝑡2 = commodity prices at time 𝑡2. By using a similar equation of  3.3, we estimate 
percentage change in external debt. 
3.6.2. Unit root test, descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
We estimate the unit root to test the stationary properties for all variables using the ADF and 
PP tests. With the exception of external debt and commodity prices, all variables included in 
the model are stationary at ρ = 0.05. The ρ-values of external debt and commodity prices 
are > 0.05, indicating that these two series are not stationary. To make these series stationary, 
we use the percentage change of these two series. The results for unit root test, descriptive 
statistics and correlation matrix are presented in Tables A 3.4, A 3.5 and A 3.6 in Appendix 
3.1. 
3.7. Empirical results 
In this section, we describe the estimated coefficients for all countries in the sample, and those 
of commodity-exporting and commodity-importing countries, estimated with the cross-section 
FE model. The result of the Hausman test indicates that the FE model is the most appropriate 
choice for this study.33  
3.7.1. Results for different country groups (full sample, commodity-exporting and 
commodity-importing countries) 
In this section, we only discuss the coefficient of the variables of interest: commodity price 
volatility and commodity price changes. The coefficients of other control variables are 
                                                          
33 Description of pooled OLS and RE are presented in Appendix 3.2. 
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consistent with literature. Table 3.2 shows the results for full sample and columns 1, 2 and 3 
represent the pooled OLS, FE and RE models, respectively. The coefficient of the commodity 
price volatility is positive (0.17, see column 2), indicating that change in external debt increases 
with commodity price volatility in all countries in the sample. All things being equal, a one 
standard deviation increase in commodity price volatility leads to growth in external debt of 
0.17 units as a share of GNI. Simultaneously, the negative coefficient of commodity price 
changes (–0.24, see column 2) indicates that growth in external debt falls with the increase in 
commodity prices. A one-unit increase in commodity prices is associated with a significant 
decrease in the change in external debt by 0.24 units. The results are consistent across all three 
panel data estimation models and are significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 3.2: Determinants of the external debt (full sample) 
 Dependent variable: 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 





































































R2 0.12 0.21 0.12 
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.16 0.12 
Periods  24 24 24 
Countries 97 97 97 
Observations 1653 1653 1653 
Note: Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in brackets. The asterisks ***, ** and * 
indicate the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Cluster standard errors are presented in square 
brackets for robustness. 
Table 3.3 shows the empirical findings of the effects of commodity price volatility in 
the growth of external debt in commodity-exporting and commodity-importing countries. The 
coefficient of the commodity price volatility is positive (0.32) and higher than the full sample, 
meaning that commodity price volatility has a larger effect in the commodity-exporting 
countries’ external debt accumulation (see column 2 in Table 3.3). This is because in 
commodity-exporting countries, commodity-linked revenues constitute a significant share of 
the government’s revenues. Conversely, commodity price volatility does not show any 
statistically significant impact on external debt in commodity-importing countries (see columns 
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4, 5 and 6). This result is consistent with the view of Cavalcanti, Mohaddes and Raissi (2012) 
that commodity-importing countries have highly diversified commodity export and import 
baskets. Thus, these countries are not fully dependent on commodity revenues and volatility in 
commodity prices has less or no effect on those countries compared to commodity-exporting 
countries.  
Table 3.3 also shows a negative nexus between change in commodity prices and growth 
in external debt, indicating that external debt accumulation significantly decreases with 
increases in commodity prices in commodity-exporting countries (see columns 1, 2 and 3). 
Exporting countries may repay their external loans by windfall revenues from commodity price 
booms. This result is supported by Swaray (2005), who finds a negative relationship between 
government debt and commodity prices in exporting countries.  
Our empirical results also show that external debt decreases with the increase in 
commodity prices in commodity-importing countries. This result contradicts the twin-deficit 
hypothesis, which states that current account deficits (when import increases above export) 
cause fiscal deficits (expenses exceed revenues). One of the plausible reasons for this negative 
link between commodity price changes and external debt is importing countries collect more 
revenue by imposing high taxes on commodities. For example, in the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, the average oil import tax is 51.3% 
per litre. 
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Table 3.3: Determinants of the external debt (commodity-exporting and importing countries) 
 Dependent variable: 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 













































































































































R2 0.13 0.20 0.13 0.12 0.24 0.12 
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.12 
Periods 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Countries 41 41 41 56 56 56 
Observations 698 698 698 955 955 955 
Note: Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in brackets. The asterisks ***, ** and * 
indicate the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Cluster standard errors are presented in square 
brackets. 
In general, it is argued that external debt accumulation significantly increases with 
commodity price volatility in all countries in the sample and commodity-exporting countries. 
However, this impact is not statistically significant in commodity-importing countries. 
Additionally, our empirical results show that external debt decreases with the increase in 
commodity prices in all country groups. 
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3.7.2. Results for different country groups with alternative exchange rate regimes 
In this section, we discuss the impact of commodity price volatility on external debt with 
alternative exchange rate regimes in line with the theoretical framework described in 
Section 3.4. In Table 3.4, we present the empirical results for full sample, and we observe that 
the coefficient of commodity price volatility is statistically significant in both fixed exchange 
rate (column 1) and managed floating exchange rate regimes (column 2) though impact is 
higher in case of fixed regimes (0.34) compared to managed foalting regime (0.32). However, 
we do not find any statistically significant impact of commodity price volatility on external 
debt growth under a floating exchange rate regime. These empirical findings support our 
theoretical description presented in Section 3.4 where Figure 3.2a shows that commodity price 
volatility has no impact on external debt under a floating exchange regime, and Figure 3.2b 
demonstrates that commodity price volatility causes higher external debt under a fixed 
exchange rate regime. Therefore, our empirical findings indicate that the impact of commodity 
price volatility on external debt decreases with exchange rate flexibilities. 
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Table 3.4: Determinants of the external debt in the full sample (based on exchange rate regimes) 
 Dependent variable: 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 
 Fixed exchange rate 
(1) 
Managed floating exchange rate 
 (2) 

































































R2 0.20 0.28 0.71 
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.20 0.56 
Periods  18 18 18 
Countries 31 67 27 
Observations 281 743 100 
Note: Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in brackets. The asterisks ***, ** and * 
indicate the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Cluster standard errors are presented in square 
brackets.  
Table 3.5 shows the results for the impact of commodity price volatility on external 
debt in commodity-exporting countries under three different exchange rate regimes. The 
coefficient of commodity price volatility is higher than the full sample (see Table 3.4) under 
both the fixed and managed floating exchange rate regimes, indicating that commodity-
exporting countries are more sensitive to commodity price volatility under both regimes. From 
the Table 3.5, we also observe that the coefficient of commodity price volatility is three times 
higher in a fixed exchange rate regime (1.21) compared with a managed floating exchange rate 
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regime (0.37). In contrast, we do not find any statistically significant impact of commodity 
price volatility under a floating exchange rate regime. 
Table 3.5: Determinants of external debt in commodity-exporting countries 
 Dependent variable: 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡  
 Fixed exchange rate 
(1) 
Managed floating exchange rate 
 (2) 

































































R2 0.24 0.27 0.90 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.19 0.74 
Periods  18 18 15 
Countries  14 30 12 
Observations 111 350 30 
Note: Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in brackets. The asterisks ***, ** and * 
indicate the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Cluster standard errors are presented in square 
brackets. 
In Table 3.6, we present the role of alternative exchange rate regimes to examine the 
impact of commodity price volatility on external debt in commodity-importing countries. The 
empirical results show that commodity price volatility on growth in external debt increases in 
managed floating exchange rate regime. However, we do not find any statistically significant 
impact under a floating exchange rate regime or under the fixed exchange rate regime, which 
is somewhat anomalous. 
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Table 3.6: Determinants of external debt in commodity-importing countries 
 Dependent variable: 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡  
 Fixed exchange rate 
(1) 
Managed floating exchange rate 
 (2) 

































































R2 0.31 0.28 0.50 
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.19 0.19 
Periods  18 18 18 
Countries  17 37 15 
Observations 170 393 70 
Note: Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in brackets. The asterisks ***, ** and * 
indicate the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Cluster standard errors are presented in square 
brackets. 
3.8. Conclusion 
This study aimed to explore the impact of commodity price volatility on external debt 
accumulation. Using dynamic panel data models for 97 countries for the period from 1993 to 
2016, this study found that external debt increases with commodity price volatility. Our 
empirical findings show that commodity price volatility has a significant adverse effect on 
external debt accumulation in the full sample and commodity-exporting countries. However, 
we do not find any statistically significant impact in commodity-importing countries.  
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This study also examines the impact of commodity price volatility in three different 
exchange rate regimes: fixed, managed floating and freely floating. Once the exchange rate is 
freely determined by market (floating exchange rate), the impact of commodity price volatility 
on external debt is statistically insignificant. When the exchange rate is completely fixed, 
compared to a managed floating exchange rate, the impact is three times higher in commodity-
exporting countries. Based on these results, we can conclude that the adoption of exchange rate 
regimes determined by markets (freely floating exchange rate regime) is critical to reduce the 
adverse impact of commodity price volatility on external debt especially in commodity-
exporting countries. 
There are several possible avenues for investigation to extend this study. For example, 
future work may focus on the role of capital flows in the relationship between commodity price 




Oil Curse, Economic Growth and Trade Openness 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The conventional intuition is that natural resources help to increase a country’s economic 
growth and development. Contrary to this, the literature reports that countries rich in natural 
resources tend to have lower real GDP per capita than resource-poor countries—this paradox 
is known as the ‘resource curse’ [see, e.g., Van der Ploeg (2011), Gylfason (2000), Sachs and 
Warner (1995), and Auty (1993)].34 For example, oil-rich countries such as Venezuela, Nigeria 
and the Republic of the Congo are poor in terms of real GDP per capita, while some resource-
poor countries such as Singapore, South Korea and Hong Kong have very high real GDP per 
capita. 35  The literature identifies several factors that explain this paradox such as poor 
institutional quality, political rent-seeking, commodity price volatility and lack of 
diversification. However, several other factors remain unexplored. This study examines a 
country’s trade openness as a channel that may influence the resource curse.36 The idea that 
trade openness increases economic growth is well known; however the role of trade openness 
in reducing the resource curse is yet to be explored. 
Trade openness increases real GDP per capita in a resource-rich country in different 
ways. Our hypothesis is that increased trade helps to lessen the resource curse problem by 
reallocating resources more efficiently. It provides countries access to the international market 
and higher prices for their products. This access to international prices increases the country’s 
income and real GDP per capita. Trade openness also makes available opportunities to use 
                                                          
34 The term ‘resource curse’ was first coined by Auty (1993) to explain the negative relationship between resource 
dependency and economic growth. 
35 Note that this is not true for all countries. For example, oil-rich countries such as Norway, Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar have high GDP per capita. 
36 Trade openness is the sum of export and import of the goods and services measured as a percentage of GDP. 
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advanced technologies for more efficient extraction of natural resources. With the use of new 
technologies, natural resource–rich countries can produce intermediate and final goods from 
primary goods and earn more profits. Trade openness helps to modernise the full economy by 
improving other related sectors such as roads and transport systems (Pedersen 2000), financial 
sectors (Braun & Raddatz 2008) and bureaucratic systems (Dutt 2009). Overall, trade openness 
plays a crucial role in converting natural resources into a blessing rather a curse. Figure 4.1 
shows the relationship between real GDP per capita and oil rent (% of GDP) for the period 
1980–2017. 
Figure 4.1: Relation between real GDP per capita and oil rent (% of GDP) in countries 
with higher oil reserves. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on WB (2019) data. 
Despite the positive impact of trade openness on economic growth and development, it 
was not considered comprehensively when studying the resource curse, aside from a brief 
discussion in a few studies.37 Arezki and Van der Ploeg (2011) investigate the role of trade and 
institutions in reducing the resource curse and find that the resource curse becomes weaker in 
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countries with a high degree of trade openness. In their seminal study, Sachs and Warner (1995) 
also find that trade openness improves economic growth by reducing the resource curse. 
However, these studies are based on cross-section growth models where the average growth 
over recent decades is regressed on a measure of resource abundance and a selection of control 
variables. 
In this study, we use a dynamic panel data framework to investigate the impact of trade 
openness on the resource curse.38 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to explore 
the relationship between the resource curse and trade openness in a dynamic panel data 
framework (rather than cross-sectional long-term perspective).39 
This study uses an unbalanced dynamic panel data model that covers 95 countries for 
the period 1980–2017. Countries and periods are based on data availability from the WB and 
IMF. We use the data for the full sample period (1980–2017) and also provide estimations 
splitting the sample period into two subsample periods: 1980–1994 (before the WTO) and 
1995–2017 (after the WTO). We assume that the commencement of the WTO in 1995 
contributed to significant increases in international trade and that increased trade helps to lessen 
the resource curse by more efficiently reallocating resources. Moreover, many countries 
reduced their trade tariffs under the WTO agreements which has helped to boost international 
trade during the last two decades.40  For example, China abolished non-tariff barriers and 
reduced tariffs in the manufacturing sector after it joined the WTO in 2001. This significantly 
                                                          
38 Panel data usually gives researchers a large number of data points, increasing the degrees of freedom and 
reducing the collinearity among explanatory variables, thus improving the efficiency of econometric estimates 
(Hsiao 2014). Moreover, the combined panel data matrix set consists of a time series for each cross-sectional 
member in the data set and offer a variety of estimation methods (Asteriou & Hall 2015). 
39 Few studies use panel data models to discuss the resource curse hypothesis. By using a panel data model 
consisting of 56 countries from 1972–2000, Mavrotas, Murshed and Torres (2011) found that point resource 
dependence harms economic growth in developing countries.  
40 The WTO is an intergovernmental organisation that deals with the regulation of trade in goods, services and 
intellectual property between participating countries by providing a framework for negotiating trade agreements 
and a dispute resolution process. Subramanian and Wei (2007) argue that the WTO contributed to 120 per cent 
more trade in 2000, valued about US$8 trillion. 
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increased the demand for metals such as copper, aluminium, and steel (Coates & Luu 2012). 
This increased demand probably had an exogenous impact on the growth of other countries. 
For example, Andersen et al. (2014) empirically found that China’s accession to the WTO 
contributed to improving the growth rate in sub-Saharan African countries. 
This study focuses on oil as a natural resource because it is a highly tradeable 
commodity. As oil price is directly linked to the production process, it may have a significant 
impact on inflation, employment and output (Guo & Kliesen 2005). Moreover, point-source 
resources such as oil are more prone to rent-seeking that leads to resource curse (Boschini, 
Pettersson & Roine 2007, and Isham et al. 2005).41 In this study, we use oil rent (% of GDP) 
as a measure of natural resource abundance.42 Although our study finds the existence of the 
resource curse, trade openness significantly decreases the resource curse problem, especially 
after the introduction of the WTO. 
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, no previous studies have examined trade openness as a transmission channel for 
reducing the resource curse by using dynamic panel data models. Second, using panel data 
allows us to evaluate the effect of trade openness over time and, particularly, the impact of the 
dramatic changes that followed the commencement of the WTO. Finally, the time dimension 
of the panel data allows us to include periods of important recent fluctuations such as the global 
financial crisis and European sovereign debt crisis. 
                                                          
41 A point-source resource is a resource concentrated in a single identifiable location (i.e., not diffused in wide 
areas). 
42 Following Bjorvatn, Farzanegan and Schneider (2012); Arezki and Brückner (2011); Bhattacharyya and Hodler 
(2010); and Collier and Hoeffler (2005), we use oil rents (% of GDP) as a proxy of natural resource abundance. 
Rents are basically net profits from resource extraction, defined as the value of the product minus total cost of 
production. Rents measure the value of natural resources for a country. More precisely, they provide a less 
ambiguous measure of resource dependence compared with those previously used such as primary commodity 
exports, oil exports and reserves. The rent data tells us the value of the resource in the open market relative to the 
productivity of the economy, and, indirectly, the value of capturing them (De Soysa & Neumayer 2007). For 
robustness, we use the natural resource rent (% of GDP). We define ‘abundance’ as the resource contributing a 
large share of a country’s GDP. 
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The study proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview of the resource curse 
literature. Section 4.3 describes the conceptual framework of the importance of trade. The 
methodology of this study is described in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 describes the data and 
description of the variables and Section 4.6 presents the empirical results from panel data 
estimations. Section 4.7 provides our conclusions and directions for future studies. 
4.2. Overview of the resource curse literature 
To study the role of natural resources in economic growth, it is essential to investigate the 
mechanisms that link endowments of natural resources to poor economic performance. In the 
literature, various economic and political reasons have been discussed for the failure to 
transform natural resources into economic growth including the ‘Dutch disease’, political rent-
seeking and corruption, poor institutional quality, commodity price volatility and lack of 
diversification. We discuss these factors in detail in the following sections. 
4.2.1. The Dutch disease 
One of the most common economic reasons suggested for the resource curse is popularly 
known as the Dutch disease. In most resource-rich countries, sectors other than resources are 
likely to suffer from a real appreciation of the national currency due to natural resource earnings, 
in part, being absorbed by the domestic non-tradeable sectors [see, e.g., Papyrakis and Gerlagh 
(2007), Iimi (2007), Sachs and Warner (1995), and Corden and Neary (1982)].43 This results 
in exports from the non-resources sectors (usually manufacturing) become more expensive 
relative to the world market, thus making those sectors less competitive. Consequently, total 
national income is reduced, ultimately causing economic growth to slow. This mechanism is 
known as the ‘spending effect’ (see Figure 4.2). 
                                                          
43 Corden (1984) and Corden and Neary (1982) first developed the Dutch disease model. Iimi (2007) described 
Dutch disease as the most prominent channel of the resource curse. Sachs and Warner (1995) argued that the 
Dutch disease is responsible for the slow economic growth of resource-rich African countries. 
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Figure 4.2: The spending effect in the ‘Dutch disease’ 
  




   Source: Badeeb, Lean and Clark (2017). 
4.2.2. Political rent-seeking and corruption 
According to Deacon and Rode (2015), Hodler (2006), Lam and Wantchekon (2003), and 
Gylfason (2001) the powerful political elites of resource-rich countries can control revenues 
from natural resources. These elites tend to distribute the windfall revenues for the benefit of 
their own existing business and personal networks, instead of investing them in the 
development sectors. This rent-seeking behaviour increases income inequality which hampers 
sustainable economic growth. Moreover, such revenue windfalls are considered to be one of 
the major reasons for the increasing conflict between stakeholders such as taxpayers, politicians, 
local tribes and developers (Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian 2013). Such conflict discourages 
both domestic and international investment which also leads to lower economic growth. 
4.2.3. Poor institutional quality 
Another reason for the resource curse—and closely related to political rent-seeking—is poor 
institutional quality. According to Mavrotas, Murshed and Torres (2011) and Mehlum, Moene 
and Torvik (2006), a country’s institutional quality plays an important role in determining 
whether an abundance of natural resources is a blessing or a curse. It is argued that high levels 
of growth in resource-rich countries are due to the way in which rents from natural resources 
are distributed through existing institutional arrangements. If institutional quality is good, a 
generous endowment of natural resource is a blessing. Sarmidi, Hook Law and Jafari (2014), 
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Torvik (2009), and Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006)  argue that the adverse effect of natural 
resource abundance on economic growth will be dissipated if institutional quality is improved. 
4.2.4. Commodity price volatility 
Commodity price volatility is another important channel for the resource curse. According to 
the Bellemare, Barrett and Just (2013), Dwyer, Gardner and Williams (2011), Tujula and 
Wolswijk (2004), and Dehn (2000), commodity price volatility generates uncertainty in the 
economy, delays stability in the budget, undermines the predictability of economic planning 
and potentially contributes to lower economic growth. Moreover, Catão and Kapur (2004) 
argue that during volatile periods countries need more international borrowing to smooth 
consumption. Moreover, countries in this situation can expect to face stringent constraints on 
their borrowing capacity since financial markets will not only be aware of the default risk that 
volatility itself generates but will also be mindful that aggregate consumption and real 
investment decrease in times of commodity price volatility. These dynamics will likely lead to 
lower economic growth.44 
4.2.5. Lack of diversification 
Another reason for the resource curse is the lack of economic diversification in countries 
abundant in natural resources. The major share of export earrings in these countries is generated 
from just one or a few resources. This leads to economic vulnerability from exogenous shocks 
and results in slow economic growth (De Ferranti et al. 2002). Moreover, the natural resource 
sector is generally capital intensive and location specific (Masten & Crocker 1985). 
Consequently, natural resource development brings few positive externalities to forward and 
                                                          
44 According to Başkaya, Hülagü and Küçük (2013), Salim and Rafiq (2011), and Guo and Kliesen (2005), 
consumer demand decreases due to the adoption of a precautionary savings mindset by consumers who are worried 
and uncertain about future income and unemployment levels as they are fearful that these levels may be adversely 
impacted during a period of commodity price volatility. Consequently, real investment decreases during periods 
of price volatility (Masih, Peters & De Mello 2011, Henriques & Sadorsky 2011, Guo & Kliesen 2005, Bredin & 
Fountas 2005). 
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backward industries (Sachs & Warner 1995). Therefore, the learning-by-doing effect is not 
expected to be powerful in these economies. 
There is considerable literature on the above-mentioned transmission channels that give 
rise to the resource curse, but scant discussion about the dynamics associated with trade 
openness. Therefore, this study, which investigates the role of trade openness using panel data 
models, brings a new dimension to the resource curse literature. 
4.3. Conceptual framework: Importance of trade in resource-rich countries 
The uneven geographical distribution of resource endowment between countries plays a 
critically important part in explaining the significance of trade openness. Most of the world’s 
natural resources are concentrated in a relatively small number of countries, while many 
countries have limited or no natural resources. For example, about 90 per cent of the world’s 
proven oil reserves are in just 13 countries (BP 2017).45 Consequently, international trade plays 
a significant role in reducing the disparity in natural resource endowment of countries by 
allowing resources to move from areas of excess supply to areas of excess demand. Moreover, 
due to the excessive fixed costs in extracting the resources, large-scale extraction is required to 
achieve economies of scale. Large-scale production is only beneficial if there is a large market 
for exports of that resource. Overall, international trade is associated with a more efficient 
allocation of natural resources that leads to an increase in social welfare (Cho & Diaz 2011). 
Another important feature of natural resources is the dominant position of this sector in 
national economies. Many of resource-rich countries tend to rely on a narrow range of export 
products. Figure 4.3 shows the value of export product concentration index (PCI) of different 
                                                          
45 The Middle East countries (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Syria, United Arab Emirate, Qatar, Yemen and 
Oman) contain about 48 per cent of the world’s total oil reserve, and Venezuela contains nearly 18 per cent as of 
2016. The distribution of other fuels is also concentrated in a very small number of countries. For example, 10 
countries possess 80 per cent of global natural gas reserves in 2016, and just nine countries have 90 per cent of 
the world’s coal reserves. 
63 
countries along with shares of natural resources in total merchandise exports for selected 
economies.46 The PCI is based on the number of products in the Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC) at the three-digit level that exceeds 0.3 per cent of a given country’s 
exports collected from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
  Figure 4.3: Dominance of fuel resource exports  
 
              Source: Author’s calculation based on UNCTAD (2016) and WB (2019). 
Figure 4.3 shows that the share of fuel in Kuwait, Brunei, Iraq and Angola is close to 
100 per cent of total merchandise exports by 2015. With very few exceptions, countries with a 
high concentration index also have a high share of fuel resources in their total merchandise 
exports. The dominance of natural resources in exports follows the hypothesis of comparative 
advantage theory arguing that countries will specialise in the production of goods where they 
have a comparative advantage and export them in exchange for other products. This is a direct 
                                                          
46 The PCI shows to what extent exports and imports of individual countries or country groups are concentrated 
on several products rather than being distributed homogeneously among products. It is measured as: 
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implication of the Heckscher-Ohlin model which proposes that countries export what they can 
produce. 
Overall, the above-described two characteristics of natural resources explain the 
importance of international trade to the efficient distribution of natural resources. As the 
government’s revenue in resource-rich countries depends on one or few resources, if there are 
trade barriers then total revenue will decrease, causing slower economic growth. For example, 
Iran’s government revenue and economic growth largely depend on the export of crude oil. 
However, due to some international restrictions, Iran cannot produce and sell oil at the optimum 
level and, thus, is forced to sell in the domestic market at a lower price. Consequently, Iran 
loses revenue, hampering economic growth. In general, economic growth largely depends on 
trade openness, especially for resource-rich economies. 
4.4. Methodology 
To explore the impact of oil rent (% of GDP) on economic growth, we use the cross-section 
and period fixed effect model (combined model). However, other five-panel data estimation 
models— pooled OLS, FE, RE, period fixed effect (PFE), period random effect (PRE)—are 
also considered for robustness.47 The combined model allows us to eliminate bias arising from 
both unobservable variables that differ over time and across countries. For example, real GDP, 
trade and oil rent will differ between countries due to their differing geographies, natural 
endowments, political and cultural systems and other basic factors. These variables, however, 
do not differ over time. On the other hand, technological development or international 
agreements can change productivity growth globally which increases output over time. PFE 
model removes the effect of those country-invariant characteristics. Consequently, the 
combined fixed effect model removes the effect of those time-invariant and cross-section 
                                                          
47 These models are described in Appendix 4.2. 
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invariant characteristics from the model so that we can assess the net impact of oil rent (% of 
GDP) on economic growth. We adopt the following combined model to examine the impact of 
oil rent on economic growth: 
∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽0𝑡 +  𝛽1∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1  +  𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽4𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + Ɛ𝑖,𝑡                              (4.1) 
Where ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the change in log of real GDP per capita; ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 represents the 
lag in the change in log of real GDP per capita; 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 indicates the log in oil rent (% of GDP); 
𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡, 𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡, 𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡  and 𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 indicate log in unemployment rate (% of total force), log 
in foreign direct investment (% of GDP), log in current account balance (% of GDP) and log 
in military expense (% of GDP) respectively; 𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the log of the infant mortality rate 
(per 1,000 live births); and 𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 represents the log of trade openness (% of GDP). A detailed 
description of the variables included in equation (4.1) is presented in Table A 4.1 in Appendix 
4.1. 
The subscripts i and t denote country and period respectively. 𝛽0𝑖  and 𝛽0𝑡  are the 
unobserved time-invariant and country-invariant individual effect respectively and the 
idiosyncratic disturbance term is denoted by Ɛ𝑖,𝑡. By using lag dependent variable, we capture 
autocorrelation in the model. In this study, we also include an interaction term in equation (4.1), 
denoted by 𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 , to examine the hypothesis that trade openness significantly reduces 
the resource curse.  
Change in GDP per capita (∆𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒊,𝒕): Change in log of real GDP per capita is our 
dependent variable and is denoted by ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 in the model. As we want to measure the impact 
of oil rent (% of GDP) on the economic growth, we use change in log of real GDP per capita 
because it represents the level of development of a country.  
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Oil rent (𝑳𝑶𝑰𝑳𝒊,𝒕): According to the conventional view, resource abundance stimulates 
economic growth. However, Sachs and Warner (1995) argue that resource abundance impedes 
economic growth which is known as resource curse. By following Bjorvatn, Farzanegan and 
Schneider (2012), Arezki and Brückner (2011), Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) and Collier 
and Hoeffler (2005), we use oil rents (% of GDP) as a measure of natural resource abundance. 
Rents are basically net profits from resource extraction, defined as the value of the product 
minus the total cost of production. Rents measure the value of natural resources for a country 
more precisely, providing a less ambiguous measure of resource abundance compared with 
those used previously such as primary commodity exports, oil exports and reserves. In this 
study, we expect the sign of oil rent (% of GDP) will be negative (-). 
Unemployment rate (𝑳𝑼𝑵𝒊,𝒕): According to the Okun’s law, a one per cent increase 
in unemployment rate causes two per cent decreases in GDP. A country faces higher costs in 
the form of unemployment benefits which negatively affects economic growth. An increased 
unemployment rate also increases the chance of social unrest. We expect the sign of this 
variable will be negative (-). 
Foreign direct investment ( 𝑳𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊,𝒕 ): FDI plays a significant role in improving 
economic growth. It also indicates the strength of a country’s financial market. According to 
Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee (1998), FDI is an important vehicle for the transfer of 
technologies, knowledge and human capital, all associated with higher productivity. Thus, the 
relationship between FDI and change in real GDP per capita would be positive (+). 
Current account balance (𝑳𝑪𝑨𝑩𝒊,𝒕): It is expected that current account balance has a 
positive impact on economic growth. If a country’s balance increases, indicating that its exports 
exceed its imports, that encourages investment and FDI. Sahin and Mucuk (2014) found that 
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current account deficit negatively affects economic growth in developing countries. Therefore, 
it is expected that the sign of this variable will be positive (+). 
Military expense (𝑳𝑴𝒊,𝒕): According to Cappelen, Gleditsch and Bjerkholt (1984), 
military expenditure reduces economic growth. As this expenditure increases, so does 
government total expenditure, leading to higher tax rates in the private sector that ultimately 
reduce private investment and the country’s output. Our expected sigh of this variable is 
negative (-). 
Mortality rate (𝑳𝑴𝑶𝑹𝒊,𝒕): It is expected that decrease in mortality rate promotes 
economic growth. According to the Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) decrease in mortality rate reduces 
the precautionary demand for children and increases potential investment in each child that 
increases the human capital and productivity for an economy. Our expected sigh of this variable 
is negative (-). 
Trade openness (𝑳𝑻𝒊,𝒕): Trade openness (% of GDP) is calculated as the total of 
exports and imports expressed as a percentage share of GDP. According to endogenous growth 
theories, a country with more trade openness will grow faster than a country with a lower 
degree of openness, because the former has more opportunity to adopt new technologies. Also, 
trade openness increases the flow of international capital in the form of FDI. There is likely to 
be less interest in investing in an economy that imposes tariffs and non-tariff barriers on 
investment and that creates barriers to the repatriation of capital and profits. Consequently, 
trade openness boosts international trade and capital flows which stimulate economic growth. 
It is expected that the sign of trade openness (% of GDP) will be positive (+). 
Interaction term: In this study, we are interested in the interaction between trade 
openness (% of GDP) and oil rent (% of GDP) to examine the hypothesis that the resource 
curse will decrease as the degree of trade openness increases. This is because trade openness 
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increases opportunities to obtain a higher price for resources in the international market and 
use advanced technologies to improve productivity and economic growth. We expect a positive 
(+) sign for this coefficient. 
In equation (4.1), we use estimates for the full sample period (1980–2017) and two 
subsample periods (1980–1994 and 1995–2017) to allow us to examine the hypothesis that the 
WTO impacts the resource curse. We also estimate equation (4.1) for the alternative measures 
of trade openness [exports (% of GDP) and imports (% of GDP)], and alternative measure of 
resource abundance: natural resource rents (% of GDP). 
4.5. Data and description of the variables 
In this section, we discuss the definition of the variables and sources of the data. We also 
discuss the characteristics of the data such as unit root, descriptive statistics and correlation 
matrix of the variables. 
4.5.1. The data 
To estimate the models, this study employs an unbalanced annual panel data dataset for 95 
countries covering the period 1980–2017, where the countries and period included are 
determined by data availability.48 The data for real GDP per capita, oil rent, foreign direct 
investment, current account balance, military expense, infant mortality rate and trade openness 
are collected from the WDI of the WB. Unemployment rate data are collected from the WEO 
of the IMF.  
4.5.2. Unit root test, descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
We estimate the unit root to test the stationary for all variables by using the Augmented Ducky–
Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips–Perron (PP) test. With the exception of real GDP per capita, all 
                                                          
48 List of 95 countries are documented in Table A 4.2 in Appendix 4.1. 
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variables included in the model are stationary at p = 0.05. The p-value of log real GDP per 
capita is >0.05, indicating that this variable is not stationary. To make the series stationary, we 
take the first difference of this series. The results of the unit root, descriptive statistics and 
correlation matrix are presented in Tables A 4.3, A 4.4 and A 4.5 respectively in Appendix 4.1. 
4.6. Results and discussion 
In this section, we describe all empirical results estimated by six estimation methods—
combined model, pooled OLS, FE, RE,  PFE and PRE. In Section 4.6.1, we describe the 
estimated coefficients for the full sample period (1980–2017) and two subsample periods 
(1980–1994 and 1995–2017) estimated with the combined fixed effect model. 
4.6.1. Main results 
Table 4.1 reports the results. In this section, we only discuss the coefficient of the variables of 
interest—log in oil rent, log in trade openness and the interaction term between log in oil rent 
and log in trade openness. Other coefficients are consistent with the literature. The coefficient 
of log in oil rent is negative, indicating that log in change of real GDP per capita decreases with 
the increase of log in oil rent and the estimated elasticity is –0.04 (see column 1 in Table 4.1). 
All other things being equal, a one per cent increase in oil rent is associated with a decrease in 
change in real GDP per capita of over 0.04 per cent. This negative association between growth 
in real GDP per capita and oil rent is evidence of the resource curse. 
The positive coefficient of log in trade openness indicates that trade openness positively 
affects growth in real GDP per capita. The coefficient of the interaction term between log in 
trade openness and log in oil rent is also positive, indicating that opening to trade reduces the 
negative impact of log in oil rent on log in change of real GDP per capita. These results are 
significant (p = 0.01) and consistent with different time and country fixed effect and random 
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effect models. The growth impact of a marginal increase in oil rent implied from equation (4.1) 
is: 
                                       
𝑑(∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡)
𝑑(𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡)
=  − 0.04 +  0.01 (𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠)  
We see that the resource curse is weaker where there is a higher level of trade openness. 
The coefficient of oil rent is –0.04, but when we add the value of interaction term the value of 
the coefficient becomes smaller in absolute term (–0.04 + 0.01 = |–0.03| < |–0.04|). Statistically, 
we can observe that resource curse decreases by 25% with the opening to trade.  
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Table 4.1: Change in real GDP per capita and oil rent (% of GDP) in sample period (1980–
2017). 

















































































































































































R2 0.48 0.26 0.33 0.26 0.42 0.30 
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.26 0.30 0.26 0.41 0.30 
Periods 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Countries 95 95 95 95 95 95 
Observations 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 
Note: Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in the bracket. The asterisks ***, ** and 





To investigate the impact of the WTO, we split our full sample period (1980–2017) into 
two subsample periods (1980–1994 and 1995–2017). We hypothesise that the introduction of 
the WTO on 1 January 1995 may have significantly increased international trade and, thereby, 
reduced the resource curse.49 According to Goldstein, Rivers and Tomz (2007) and Tomz, 
Goldstein and Rivers (2007), participation in the WTO substantially increased trade for the 
whole world. Moreover, Nicita, Olarreaga and Silva (2013) demonstrate that the average 
country would face a 32 per cent increase in tariffs on their exports in the absence of the WTO. 
In Table 4.2, we present the empirical findings on the nexus between real GDP per 
capita and oil rent for the two subsample periods (1980–1994 in column 1 and 1995–2017 in 
column 2) and compare these with the full sample period (column 3). The coefficient of log in 
oil rent in the period 1980–1994 is negative, and the estimated elasticity is –0.05 (column 1 in 
Table 4.2). All other things being equal, a one per cent increase in oil rent is associated with a 
significant decrease in the change of real GDP per capita of over 0.05 per cent on average. The 
size of the coefficient is about 40% and 20% higher than subsample period 1995–2017 (column 
2) and the full sample period 1980–2017 (column 3) respectively. 
From column 2 in Table 4.2, we observe that the coefficient of interaction term 
(between log in oil rent and log in trade openness) is positive and statistically significant during 
the period 1995–2017. This result indicates that trade openness has a significant impact on 
reducing the resource curse during that period. However, we do not find any statistically 
significant impact of trade openness during the period 1980–1994 (refer to column 1), although 
the coefficient is positive and similar with the other periods. Therefore, we can say that the 
result in the period 1995-2017 led to the results for the full sample period (column 3). 
                                                          
49 We split sample periods based on the introduction of the WTO, not the GATT, because most economies started 
following the WTO’s rules and regulations in 1995 (124 countries in 1995 and 164 in 2017), prior to the GATT 
in 1947. 
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Table 4.2: Change in real GDP per capita and oil rent (% of GDP) in different sample periods. 
























































































R2 0.49 0.50 0.48 
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.47 0.44 
Periods 15 23 38 
Countries 57 95 95 
Observations 564 1,935 2,499 
Note: Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in the bracket. The asterisks ***, ** and 
* indicate the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Cluster standard errors are presented in 
square brackets. 
From the above discussion, it is concluded that there is a negative relationship between 
log in oil rent (% of GDP) and log in change of real GDP per capita; that is, the resource curse. 
Although in classical theories it is assumed that an abundance of natural resources is a blessing 
for economic growth, we concur with Sachs and Warner (1995) who empirically show that 
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resources are a curse for the economy. However, we provide evidence that trade openness can 
reduce the resource curse. 
4.6.2. Robustness results 
To check the robustness of the results, we use two alternative measures of trade openness—
exports (% of GDP) and imports (% of GDP).50 Our empirical findings show that the resource 
curse reduces with the increase of both exports and imports. With the increase of exports, 
economies can gain access to international prices and earn more revenue from royalties, 
thereby increasing real GDP per capita. On the other hand, countries can import advance 
technologies to more efficiently extract oil resources and/or produce final products to earn more 
revenue that increases real GDP per capita. For further robustness, we use natural resource rent 
(% of GDP) instead of oil rent (% of GDP) as a measure of resource abundance and find similar 
results.51 All robustness findings are presented in Tables A 4.6–A 4.10 in Appendix 4.3. 
4.6.3. Discussion of the results 
Overall, the panel data regression models suggest that having an abundance of oil resources 
plays a significant role in slowing economic growth—that is, it serves as a resource curse. 
Many reasons have been put forward in the literature for this surprising result, including rent-
seeking behaviour, poor institutional quality, commodity price volatility and lack of 
diversification. In this study, we investigated the impact of trade openness in reducing the 
resource curse. Our empirical findings show that trade openness significantly decreases the 
resource curse in our full sample period (1980–2017). More open trade policies provide access 
to advanced technologies that increase efficiency by reallocating the factors of production. 
                                                          
50 Exports (% of GDP) and Imports (% of GDP) represent the value of all goods and services provided and received 
to and from the rest of the world respectively.  
51 Natural resource rent (% of GDP) is the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents, mineral rents and forest 
rents. Data for Exports (% of GDP), Imports (% of GDP) and natural resource rent (% of GDP) are collected from 
the WDI of the WB. 
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These trade policies also facilitate access to large markets where increasing competition drives 
innovations and strengthens managerial skills which in turn generates substantial economic 
growth. Accordingly, Arezki and Van der Ploeg (2011) report that the resource curse has turned 
into a blessing in countries with a high degree of trade openness such as Australia, Bolivia, 
Barbados, Canada, Chile, Malaysia and the United States. 
To understand the role of the WTO in increasing merchandise trade, we split our sample 
period into two subsample periods, 1980–1994 (pre-WTO) and 1995–2017 (post-WTO). Our 
empirical findings suggest that trade openness had a significant impact on reducing the resource 
curse in the sample period 1995–2017. However, there was no significant effect in the sample 
period 1980–1994, possibly due to the fact that total merchandise trade increased after the 
commencement of the WTO in 1995 which helped to weaken the strength of the dynamics 
driving the resource curse. 
Overall, based on our empirical findings, we can argue that outward-looking trade 
policy is helpful for economic growth and reduces the risk of experiencing the resource curse. 
Therefore, policymakers should concentrate on how they can make the economy more open by 
reducing existing tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Increased international trade (both export and 
import) helps economies to be more efficient by enabling the adoption of new technologies and 
sharing of advanced knowledge which generates long-run economic growth. 
4.6.4. Marginal effect 
Marginal effect tells us how the dependent variable changes when a specific explanatory 
variable change in the regression analysis. In case of continuous variables, marginal effect 
measures the instantaneous rate of change. Marginal effect estimation provides a good estimate 
to the amount of change in the dependent variable that will be produced by a change in 
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independent variables. In this study, we compute the marginal effect of oil rent on the change 
in GDP per capita. Based on the estimates in Table 4.1, this produced: 
                                      
𝑑(∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡)
𝑑(𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡)
=  − 0.04 +  0.01 (𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠)                               (4.2) 
From the above equation, we can see that the marginal effect of oil rent on the change 




, on the Y-axis and trade openness on the X-axis. From 4.4a plot, we 
can observe that the marginal effect of the oil rent on economic growth is an increasing function 
of trade openness in the full sample period. We also observe from Figure 4.4a that this effect 
becomes positive and significant with higher trade openness. In Figures 4.4b and 4.4c, we 
present the marginal effect of trade openness on real GDP per capita growth for the sample 
period 1980–1994 and 1995–2017 respectively, and we observe that in the sample period 
1980–1994 there is no significant impact of trade openness on GDP. So, the results in the 
sample period 1995–2017 led to the results for the full sample period.52 
Figure 4.4a: Marginal effect of oil rent on economic growth (full sample period  
1980–2017) 
 
                                                          
52 The figures of all robust analysis are presented in Appendix 4.4 (Figures A 4.1, A4.2, A4.3, A4.4, and A 4.5). 
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Figure 4.4b: Marginal effect of oil rent on economic growth (sample period  
1980–1994) 
 








4.7. Conclusion  
This study aims to revisit the resource curse paradox and examines the role of trade openness 
in reducing the resource curse. Using different dynamic panel data models for 95 countries for 
the period 1980–2017, this study finds that economic growth decreases with the increase of oil 
resource abundance. A one per cent increase in oil rent causes a 0.04 per cent decrease in real 
GDP per capita. Although our empirical findings support the resource curse hypothesis, the 
study finds that trade openness is a possible channel to reduce the resource curse. On average, 
trade openness reduces the negative effect of oil rent on real GDP per capita by 25%. Trade 
openness allows countries to obtain competitive prices for their resources in the international 
market and access advanced technologies to more efficiently extract resources. We also find 
that trade openness significantly affects the resource curse after the introduction of the WTO. 
An important policy implication is that natural resource–rich economies that want to reduce 
the resource curse should consider further opening their economies. 
This study can be extended by focusing on another transmission channel of the resource 
curse, income inequality. According to Fum and Hodler (2010) and Parcero and Papyrakis 
(2016), income inequality is high in resource-rich countries, especially those with point-source 
resources. One reason is that inefficient allocation of resources among sectors increases income 
inequality. Trade openness plays an important role in reallocating resources in the sectors 
where a country has a comparative advantage. This efficient distribution of resources helps to 










Commodity price volatility creates uncertainty in the economy, delays stability in government 
and private budgets, undermines the predictability of economic planning and ultimately 
contributes to lower economic growth. The literature on the impact of commodity price 
volatility on economic growth is extensive; however, the impact of commodity price volatility 
on fiscal positions is yet unexplored. To fill this gap, we explore the impact of commodity price 
volatility on governments’ fiscal performance and external debt accumulation. In this 
dissertation, we explore trade openness as a channel for mitigating the oil resource curse. 
In Chapter 2, we explore the impact of commodity price volatility on fiscal balance 
using dynamic panel data models for 108 countries from the period 1993 to 2018. Our empirical 
findings show that government fiscal balance decreases with commodity price volatility. After 
examining the impact of commodity price volatility in all countries in the sample, we classified 
the sample countries as commodity-exporting and commodity-importing to examine the 
hypothesis that this impact of commodity price volatility on fiscal balance differs with the level 
of resource endowment. Our empirical findings indicate that commodity price volatility 
negatively affects fiscal balance in commodity-exporting countries; however, this impact is 
statistically insignificant in commodity-importing countries. In addition, we examine the role 
of the real interest rate in influencing the relationship between commodity price volatility and 
fiscal balance. We find that lower real interest rates may be effective in reducing the negative 
impact of commodity price volatility on fiscal balance.  
In the Chapter 3 of this dissertation, we explore the impact of commodity price volatility 
on external debt accumulation using dynamic panel data models for 97 countries from the 
period 1993 to 2016. The results show that external debt accumulation increases with 
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commodity price volatility. When we split the sample countries into commodity exporters and 
importers, our empirical findings show that commodity price volatility has a statistically 
significant impact on the growth in external debt in commodity-exporting countries; however, 
this effect is statistically insignificant in commodity-importing countries. 
In addition, we examine the impact of commodity price volatility in three different 
exchange rate regimes: fixed, managed floating and freely floating exchange. Our empirical 
findings show that the adverse impact of commodity price volatility on external debt is 
statistically insignificant in countries with a floating exchange rate regime. However, we find 
that the impact is larger and statistically significant in countries with a completely fixed 
exchange rate regime than those with a managed floating exchange rate regime. Based on these 
results, it is concluded that the adoption of exchange rate regimes determined by markets 
(freely floating) is critical to reducing the impact of commodity price volatility on external debt. 
In the fourth chapter, we revisit the ‘resource curse’ paradox in terms of oil resource 
abundance and examine the role of trade openness in reducing the ‘oil curse’. Using different 
dynamic panel data models for 95 countries for the period from 1980 to 2017, we find that 
economic growth decreases with the increase of oil resource abundance. Although our 
empirical findings support the so-called ‘resource curse’ hypothesis, this study finds that trade 
openness is a possible avenue to reduce the resource curse. Trade openness allows countries to 
obtain competitive prices for their resources in the international market and access advanced 
technologies to extract resources more efficiently. Therefore, natural resource-rich economies 
can reduce the resource curse by opening themselves to international trade. 
In conclusion, this dissertation provides a deeper understanding of the nexus between 
commodity prices and the macroeconomy. In all three chapters, we provide empirical evidence 
of three different policy instruments: lower real interest rates (Chapter 2), floating exchange 
rate regimes (Chapter 3); and higher trade openness (Chapter 4). These instruments may be 
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effective in reducing the negative impact of commodity abundance on the macroeconomy. 
Therefore, this dissertation may serve as a reference for future studies and policymakers to 
ensure that natural resources are a blessing for the economy, not a curse. 
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Appendix 2.1 
Table A 2.1: Description of the variables 
Variables Mnemonic Description Source 
Dependent variable      
Fiscal balance (% of 
GDP) 
𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 Primary net lending/borrowing is net 
lending (+)/borrowing (–) plus net interest 
payable/paid. 
WEO, IMF 
Control variables      
Commodity prices  𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 All commodity price index using 2016 = 100 






𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 Use standard deviation to estimate volatility.  Author’s 
calculation 
Gross capital 
formation (annual % 
growth) 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 Annual growth rate of gross capital formation 
based on constant 2010 U.S. Gross capital 
formation consists of outlays on additions to the 
fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the 
level of inventories. 
WDI, WB 
GDP per capita 
growth (annual %) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita 
based on constant local currency. Aggregates are 
based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP per 




(% of GDP) 
𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 Military expenditures data from SIPRI are derived 
from the NATO definition, which includes all 
expenses. 
WDI, WB 
Real interest rate (%) 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 Real interest rate is the lending interest rate 
adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP 
deflator. 
WDI, WB 
Individual commodities  
crude oil, still, iron 
ore, soybean, maize, 
gold, copper, silver, 
aluminium and gas 
 All commodity price index using 2016 = 100. Commodity 
data portal, 
IMF 
Note: We use percentage change to obtain the data in stationary in commodity prices series and expressed 
as 𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 in equation 2.1. 
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Table A 2.2: List of countries (n=108) 
Albania Cote d'Ivoire Liberia Qatar 
Algeria Croatia Macedonia, FYR Romania 
Angola Czech Rep. Madagascar Russian Federation 
Argentina Dominican Republic Malawi Rwanda 
Armenia Egypt, Arab Rep. Malaysia Senegal 
Australia The Gambia Mali Serbia 
Azerbaijan Georgia Malta Seychelles 
Bahrain Guatemala Mauritia Sierra Leone 
Bangladesh Guinea Mauritius South Africa 
Belarus Haiti Mexico South Sudan 
Belize Honduras Moldova Sri Lanka 
Benin Hungary Mongolia Swaziland 
Bolivia India Montenegro Sweden 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Indonesia Mozambique Switzerland 
Botswana Iran Namibia Tajikistan 
Brazil Israel Netherlands Tanzania 
Brunei Darussalam Italy New Zealand’s Thailand 
Bulgaria Jamaica Nicaragua Timor 
Burkina Faso Japan Niger Togo 
Burundi Jordan Nigeria Uganda 
Cabo Verde Kenya Oman Ukraine 
Canada Korea Pakistan UK 
Chile Kuwait Panama USA 
China Kyrgyz Papua New Uruguay 
Colombia Lao PDR Paraguay Venezuela 
Congo, Dem. Rep Lebanon Peru Vietnam 











Table A 2.3: List of commodity-exporting and commodity-importing countries  
Commodity-exporting (n=45) Commodity-importing (n=63) 
Algeria Paraguay Albania Lesotho 
Argentina Peru Angola Liberia 
Armenia Russian Federation Azerbaijan Macedonia, FYR 
Australia Rwanda Bangladesh Madagascar 
Bahrain Senegal Belarus Malaysia 
Benin Sierra Leone Belize Malta 
Bolivia Tajikistan Bosnia and Herzegovina Mauritius 
Botswana Tanzania Brazil Mexico 
Burundi Togo Brunei Darussalam Mongolia 
Chile Uganda Bulgaria Montenegro 
Colombia Uruguay Burkina Faso Netherlands 
Cote d'Ivoire Venezuela Cabo Verde Nigeria 
Egypt, Arab Rep Zimbabwe Canada Oman 
The Gambia  China Pakistan 
Guatemala  Congo, Dem. Rep Philippines 
Honduras  Costa Rica Qatar 
Indonesia  Croatia Romania 
Iran  Czech Rep. Serbia 
Kenya  Dominican Republic Seychelles 
Korea  Georgia South Africa 
Kyrgyz Republic  Guinea South Sudan 
Malawi  Haiti Sri Lanka 
Mali  Hungary Swaziland 
Mauritia  India Sweden 
Moldova  Israel Switzerland 
Mozambique  Italy Thailand 
Namibia  Jamaica Timor 
New Zealand’s  Japan Ukraine 
Nicaragua  Jordan UK 
Niger  Kuwait USA 
Panama  Lao PDR Vietnam 









Table A 2.4: Unit root test 
 Augmented Ducky-Fuller (ADF) Phillips–Peron (PP) 
 Statistics p-value Statistics p-value 
𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 435.61 0.00 527.65 0.00 
𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 414.06 0.00 680.72 0.00 
𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 105.14 1.00 99.09 1.00 
𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 935.95 0.00 1334.24 0.00 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 905.87 0.00 1543.85 0.00 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 1050.09 0.00 1175.65 0.00 
𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 445.25 0.00 697.73 0.00 
𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 687.86 0.00 1037.70 0.00 
Note: 𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 =  Fiscal balance, 𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = Commodity price volatility, 𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = Commodity prices, 𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =
 Percentage change in commodity prices, 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  Capital growth and 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  Gross domestic product. 
𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  Real interest rate. 
Table A 2.5: Descriptive statistics 
 𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
Mean –0.56 7.25 110.02 1.83 7.36 2.47 1.95 6.74 
Median –0.61 5.31 113.57 6.17 5.25 2.52 1.58 5.52 
Maximum 36.01 30.37 182.70 20.84 744.86 38.70 12.06 93.91 
Minimum –35.06 0.99 48.04 –46.81 –164.50 –47.59 0.00 –69.53 
Standard Deviation 4.60 6.20 44.18 18.38 31.21 4.14 1.48 10.34 
Skewness 0.33 2.45 0.11 –1.22 11.96 –0.45 2.21 1.06 
Kurtosis 13.03 9.66 1.68 3.95 248.23 23.05 10.68 13.85 
Observations 1964 1964 1964 1964 1964 1964 1964 1964 
Note: 𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 =  Fiscal balance, 𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = Commodity price volatility, 𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = Commodity prices, 𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =
 Percentage change in commodity prices, 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  Capital growth and 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  Gross domestic product. 
𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =Real interest rate. 
Table A 2.6: Correlation matrix 
 𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 1.00       
𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 0.003 1.00      
𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 0.19 0.02 1.00     
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 0.06 0.009 0.10 1.00    
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 0.14 0.01 0.25 0.23 1.00   
𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 –0.08 –0.04 –0.02 –0.007 –0.11 1.00  
𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 –0.08 –0.08 –0. 61 –0.01 –0.02 –0.06  1.00 
Note: 𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡 = Fiscal balance, 𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡= Commodity price volatility, 𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = Percentage change in commodity 




A 2.2.1. Pooled OLS model 
In the pooled OLS model, we have pooled   all observations in OLS regression, meaning that, 
implicitly, we assume that the coefficient is the same for each individual country. Thus, the 
model (2.1) follows the form: 
𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0 +   𝛽1  𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽3𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + Σ𝑖=0
𝑛 𝛽5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 +𝛽8𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +  Ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                                                         (2.5) 
A 2.2.2. RE model 
The rationale of the RE model is that, unlike the FE model, the variation between entities is 
assumed to be random and uncorrelated with the predictor or independent variables included 
in the model. For example, in the RE model, it is assumed that the unobserved effects (e.g., 
geographical factors, natural endowments, political and cultural systems) are not correlated 
with commodity prices or fiscal balance. The RE model includes all FE assumptions as well as 
an additional requirement that (Ϙ𝑖) is independent of all explanatory variables in all time 
periods. Hence, the variability of the constant for each section originates from:  
                                                     𝛽0𝑖  =  𝛽0 + Ϙ𝑖                                                                    (2.6) 
where Ϙ𝑖  is a zero-mean standard random variable. Therefore, equation (2.1) with 
random effects takes the following form:  
𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0 +   𝛽1  𝐹𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽3𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +  Σ𝑖=0
𝑛 𝛽6𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 +𝛽18𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +Ϙ𝑖 +  Ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                                                (2.7) 
We estimate equations 2.5 and 2.7 for all countries and commodity groups mentioned 
above.  
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A 2.2.3. Hausman test 
Null hypothesis: RE model is appropriate 
Alternative hypothesis: FE model is appropriate 
Table A 2.2.1: Results of the Hausman test 
Country groups  Chi-Sq. Statistics p-value 
 
Comments 
Full Sample          243.97 0.00 Reject Null hypothesis 
Commodity-exporting countries 90.85 0.00 Reject Null hypothesis 
Commodity-importing countries 154.03 0.00 Reject Null hypothesis 
 
From Table A 2.2.1, we can observe that the p-value of the Hausman test is less than 
5%, indicating that we can reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis that 

















Figures A 2.1a, A 2.1b and A 2.1c show the marginal effect of oil price volatility on fiscal 
balance for the full sample, commodity-exporting and commodity-importing countries 
respectively.  
Figure A 2.1a: Impact of oil price volatility on fiscal balance (Full sample) 
 
Figure A 2.1b: Impact of oil price volatility on fiscal balance (Commodity-exporting)                                                         




Figure A 2.1c: Impact of oil price volatility on fiscal balance (Commodity-importing)                                                                                                                 
    
 
Figures A 2.2a, A 2.2b and A 2.2c show the marginal effect of steel price volatility on fiscal 
balance for the full sample, commodity-exporting and commodity-importing countries 
respectively.  





Figure A 2.2b.: Impact of steel price volatility  on fiscal balance (Commodity-exporting)                                                
      









Figures A 2.3a, A 2.3b and A 2.3c show the marginal effect of silver price volatility on fiscal 
balance for the full sample, commodity-exporting and commodity-importing countries 
respectively.  
Figure A 2.3a.: Impact of silver price volatility on fiscal balance  (Full sample) 
 
 
Figure A 2.3b: Impact of silver price volatility  on fiscal balance (Commdoity-exporting)                                                     
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Figure A 2.3c: Impact of silver price volatility on fiscal balance (Commdoity- 
importing)                                                     
  
 
Figures A 2.4a, A 2.4b and A 2.4c show the marginal effect of soybean price volatility on fiscal 
balance for the full sample, commodity-exporting and commodity-importing countries 
respectively.  




Figure A 2.4b: Impact of soybean price volatility on fiscal balance (Commodity-
exporting)                                                      
     
Figure A 2.4c: Impact of soybean price volatility on fiscal balance (Commodity-






Figures A 2.5a, A 2.5b and A 2.5c show the marginal effect of gold price volatility on fiscal 
balance for the full sample, commodity-exporting and commodity-importing countries 
respectively.  
Figure A 2.5a: Impact of gold price volatility on fiscal balance (Full sample)  
 
Figure A 2.5b: Impact of gold price volatility   on fiscal balance (Commodity-exporting)                                                     






Figure A 2.5c: Impact of gold price volatility on fiscal balance (Commodity-importing)                                                     
   
 
Figures A 2.6a, A 2.6b and A 2.6c show the marginal effect of coper price volatility on fiscal 
balance for the full sample, commodity-exporting and commodity-importing countries 
respectively.  





Figure A 2.6b: Impact of coper price volatility on fiscal balance (Commodity-exporting)                                                     
 
Figure A 2.6c: Impact of coper price volatility on fiscal balance (Commodity-importing)                                                     
   
 
Figures A 2.7a, A 2.7b and A 2.7c show the marginal effect of maize price volatility on fiscal 






Figure A 2.7a: Impact of maize price volatility on fiscal balance (Full sample)   
 
Figure A 2.7b: Impact of maize price volatility on fiscal balance (Commodity-exporting)                                                  
    
Figure A 2.7c: Impact of maize price volatility on fiscal balance (Commodity-importing)                                                  
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Figures A 2.8a, A 2.8b and A 2.8c show the marginal effect of aluminium price volatility on 
fiscal balance for the full sample, commodity-exporting and commodity-importing countries 
respectively.  
Figure A 2.8a: Impact of aluminium price volatility on fiscal balance (Full sample) 
 
Figure A 2.8b: Impact of aluminium price volatility on fiscal balance  (Commodity-
exporting) 




Figure A 2.8c: Impact of aluminium price volatility on fiscal balance (Commodity-
importing) 
     
Figures A 2.9a, A 2.9b and A 2.9c show the marginal effect of iron ore price volatility on fiscal 
balance for the full sample, commodity-exporting and commodity-importing countries 
respectively.  





Figure A 2.9b: Impact of iron ore price volatility on fiscal balance  (Commodity-
exporting)                                                     
    
Figure A 2.9c: Impact of iron ore price volatility on fiscal balance  (Commodity-






Figures A 2.10a, A 2.10b and A 2.10c show the marginal effect of gas price volatility on fiscal 
balance for the full sample, commodity-exporting and commodity-importing countries 
respectively.  
Figure A 2.10a: Impact of gas price volatility on fiscal balance  (Full sample)  
 
Figure A 2.10b: Impact of gas price volatility on fiscal balance (Commodity-exporting)    
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Table A 3.1: Description of the variables 
Variables Mnemonic Description Source 
Dependent variable      
External debt (% of 
GNI) 
𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 Total external debt stocks to gross national income is 
a debt owed to non-residents repayable in currency, 
goods, or services.  
WDI, WB 
Control variables      
Commodity prices 𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 All commodity price index using 2005=100, 






𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 Use standard deviation to estimate volatility.  Author’s 
calculation 
Real interest rate (%) 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 The real interest rate is the lending interest rate 





inflows (% of GDP) 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 Foreign direct investment is the net inflows of 
investment to acquire a lasting management interest 
in an enterprise operating in an economy.  
WDI, WB 
Current account 
balance (% of GDP)  
𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 The current account balance is the sum of net exports 
of goods and services, net primary income, and net 
secondary income. 
WDI, WB 
GDP per capita growth 
(annual %) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita 
based on constant local currency. Aggregates are 
based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars.  
WDI, WB 
Exchange rate regimes  
Natural regime 
classification 
 i. Fixed exchange rate regimes: No separate legal 
tender, and currency board arrangements. Dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 if the country uses 
fine classification 1-2 and 0 otherwise. 
ii. Managed floating regimes: Limited flexibility 
regimes Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 
if the country uses fine classification 3-12 and 0 
otherwise. 
iii. Floating exchange rate regimes: Freely 
floating, and freely falling. Dummy variable which 
takes the value of 1 if the country uses fine 





Note: We use percentage change to get the data in stationary in external debt and commodity price series and 





Table A 3.2: List of countries (n =97) 
Afghanistan Congo, Rep. Liberia Rwanda 
Albania Costa Rica Macedonia, North Samoa 
Angola Cote d’Ivoire Malawi Sao Tome 
Argentina Dominica Malaysia Senegal 
Armenia Dominican Republic Maldives Sierra Leone 
Azerbaijan Egypt, Arab Rep. Mali Solomon Islands 
Bangladesh El Salvador Mauritius South Africa 
Belarus Fiji Mexico Sri Lanka 
Belize Gabon Moldova St. Lucia 
Benin The Gambia Mongolia St. Vincent 
Bhutan Georgia Montenegro Syrian Arab Rep. 
Bolivia  Grenada Morocco Tajikistan 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Guatemala Mozambique Tanzania 
Botswana Guinea-Bissau Myanmar Thailand 
Brazil Guyana Nepal Togo 
Burkina Faso Haiti Nicaragua Tonga 
Burundi Honduras Nigeria Uganda 
Cabo Verde India Pakistan Ukraine 
Cameroon Indonesia Panama Vanuatu 
Central African Rep. Jamaica Papua New Guinea Venezuela 
Chad Jordan Paraguay Vietnam 
China Kenya Peru Zambia 
Colombia Kyrgyz Republic Philippines  
Comoros Lebanon Romania  
Congo, Dem. Lesotho Russian Federation  











Table A 3.3: List of commodity-exporting and commodity-importing countries 
Commodity-exporting countries (n = 41) Commodity-importing countries (n = 56) 
Argentina Paraguay Afghanistan Lesotho 
Armenia Peru Albania Liberia 
Benin Russia Angola Macedonia, North 
Bolivia Rwanda Azerbaijan Malaysia 
Botswana Senegal Bangladesh Maldives 
Burundi Sierra Belarus Mauritius 
Cameroon Syria Belize Mexico 
Central African Rep. Tajikistan Bhutan Mongolia 
Colombia Tanzania Bosnia Montenegro 
Congo, Rep. Togo Brazil Morocco 
Cote d’Ivoire Uganda Burkina Faso Myanmar 
Egypt Venezuela Cabo Verde Nepal 
Fiji Zambia Chad Nigeria 
Gabon  China Pakistan 
The Gambia  Comoros Philippines 
Guatemala  Congo, Dem. Romania 
Guyana  Costa Rica Samoa 
Honduras  Dominica Sao Tome 
Indonesia  Dominican Rep. Solomon Islands 
Kenya  El Salvador South Africa 
Kyrgyz Republic  Georgia Sri Lanka 
Malawi  Grenada St. Lucia 
Mali  Guinea-Bissau St. Vincent 
Moldova  Haiti Thailand 
Mozambique  India Tonga 
Nicaragua  Jamaica Ukraine 
Panama  Jordan Vanuatu 










Table A 3.4: Unit root test 
 Augmented Ducky–Fuller (ADF)            Phillips–Peron (PP) 
 Statistics p-value Statistics P-value 
𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 196.06 0.44 214.00 0.15 
𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 850.77 0.00 2898.31 0.00 
𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 336.65 0.00 493.34 0.00 
𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 101.60 1.00 92.71 1.00 
𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 460.99 0.00 980.37 0.00 
𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 576.98 0.00 1063.64 0.00 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 387.56 0.00 524.20 0.00 
𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 383.38 0.00 391.70 0.00 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 962.23 0.00 1076.96 0.00 
Note: 𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = Externa debt, 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = Percentage change in external debt, 𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡= Commodity price volatility, 
𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡= Commodity prices, ∆𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = Percentage change in commodity prices, 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =Real interest rate, 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 
Foreign direct investment, and 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 =  Current account balance, and  
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = GDP per capita growth. 
 
Table A 3.5: Descriptive statistics  
 𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 
 Mean 61.02 0.92 8.50 111.68 4.73 7.38 4.82 −5.46 2.69 
 Median 43.71 −1.44 6.51 111.25 4.52 7.17 3.26 −4.31 2.62 
 Maximum 1252.42 300.07 36.65 192.57 27.80 77.61 84.94 43.39 33.03 
 Minimum 3.89 −80.42 0.91 47.72 −35.27 −98.15 −37.16 −80.05 −22.55 
 Std. Dev. 72.11 25.19 7.82 50.16 18.19 11.26 6.26 10.20 4.25 
 Skewness 7.52 3.90 2.29 0.26 −0.50 −1.29 3.73 −0.95 0.20 
 Kurtosis 93.02 39.26 8.70 1.58 2.47 18.04 31.87 7.90 9.00 
Observations 1660 1660 1660 1660 1660 1660 1660 1660 1660 
 
Table A 3.6: Correlation matrix  
 𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 
𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 1.00       
𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 0.01 1.00      
PC𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 −0.25 0.10 1.00     
𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 0.09 −0.07 −0.14 1.00    
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 0.007 0.09 0.06 −0.005 1.00   
𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 −0.09 −0.08 0.02 −0.11 −0.55 1.00  





A 3.2.1. Pooled  OLS model 
In the pooled OLS models, we have pooled   all the observations in OLS regression meaning 
that implicitly we assume the coefficient is the same for all the individuals. So, we can write 
the model (3.1) by the following form – 
𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 
+𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +  Ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                                     (3.4)                                      
A 3.2.2. RE models 
In the RE, the variation across entities is assumed to be random and uncorrelated with the 
independent variables included in the model. The rationale behind the random effect models is 
that, unlike the fixed effect models, the variation across entities is assumed to be random and 
uncorrelated with the predictor or independent variables included in the model. The random-
effects model includes all fixed effect assumptions plus the additional requirement that (Ϙ𝑖) is 
independent of all explanatory variables in all time periods. Hence, the variability of the 
constant for each section comes from:  
                                                     𝛽0𝑖  =  𝛽0 + Ϙ𝑖                                                                       (3.5) 
Where Ϙ𝑖  is a zero-mean standard random variable. Therefore equation (3.4) with 
random effects takes the following form-  
𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝐶𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +
Ϙ𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +  Ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                                             (3.6)                                                                                                                                            
We estimate equation (3.4) and (3.6) for all country groups mentioned above. 
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A 3.2.3. Hausman test 
Null hypothesis: RE model is appropriate 
Alternative hypothesis: FE model is appropriate 
Table A 3.7: Results of the Hausman test 
Country groups  Chi-Sq. Statistics p-value 
 
Comments 
Full Sample 149.29 0.00 
 
Reject Null hypothesis 
Commodity-exporting 
countries 
49.84 0.00 Reject Null hypothesis 
Commodity-importing 
countries 
103.11 0.00 Reject Null hypothesis 
 
From Table A 3.7, we can observe that the p-value of the Hausman test is less than 
5% indicating that we can reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis that 













Table A 4.1: Description of the variables 
Variables Mnemonic Description Source 
Dependent variable      
Real GDP per capita 𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 GDP per capita is gross domestic 
product divided by mid-year 
population. Data are in constant 2010 
US dollars. 
WDI, WB 
Control variables      
Oil rents (% of GDP) 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 Oil rents are the difference between the 
value of crude oil production at 
regional prices and total costs of 
production. We add 1 before 
converting into logarithmic form. 
WDI, WB 
Unemployment rate (% 
of total labour force) 
𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡 Unemployment rate can be defined by 
the OECD harmonised definition. The 
OECD harmonised unemployment rate 
gives the number of unemployed 




investment, net outflows 
(% of GDP) 
𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 Foreign direct investment refers to 
direct investment equity flows in an 
economy. It is the sum of equity 
capital, reinvestment of earnings, and 
other capital. We add 100 before 
converting into logarithmic form. 
WDI, WB 
Current account balance 
(% of GDP) 
 
𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 Current account balance is the sum of 
net exports of goods and services, net 
primary income and net secondary 
income. We add 250 before converting 
into logarithmic form. 
WDI, WB 
Military expense (% of 
GDP) 
 
𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 Military expenditures data from SIPRI 
are derived from the NATO definition, 
which includes all current and capital 
expenditures on the armed forces. We 
add 1 to convert logarithmic form. 
WDI, WB 
Mortality rate, infant 
(per 1,000 live births) 
 
𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 Infant mortality rate is the number of 
infants dying before reaching one year 
of age, per 1,000 live births in a given 
year. 
WDI, WB 
Trade openness (% of 
GDP) 
𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 Trade is the sum of exports and imports 
of goods and services measured as a 
share of GDP. 
WDI, WB 
Note: We use first difference to get the data in stationary in real GDP per capita series and expressed as ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 
in equation 4.1. 
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Table A 4.2: List of countries (n = 95) 
Albania China Indonesia Mexico Serbia 
Algeria Colombia Iran Moldova Seychelles 
Argentina Costa Rica Irelands Mongolia Singapore 
Armenia Croatia Israel Morocco Slovak Rep. 
Australia Cyprus Italy Netherlands Slovenia 
Austria Czech Rep. Jamaica New Zealand South Africa 
Azerbaijan Denmark Japan Nicaragua Spain 
Bahrain Dominican Rep. Jordan Nigeria Sri Lanka 
Belarus Ecuador Kazakhstan Norway Sweden 
Belgium Egypt, Arab Rep. Korea, Rep. Pakistan Switzerland  
Belize El Salvador Kuwait Panama Thailand 
Bolivia Estonia Kyrgyz Rep. Paraguay Tunisia 
Bosnia & Herzegovina Finland Latvia Peru Turkey 
Brazil France Lithuania Philippines Ukraine 
Brunei Darussalam Georgia Luxemburg Poland The UK 
Bulgaria Germany Macedonia Portugal The USA 
Cabo Verde Greece Malaysia Romania Uruguay 
Canada Honduras Malta Russian Federation Venezuela 
Chile Hungary Mauritius Saudi Arabia Vietnam 
 
Table A 4.3: Unit root test 
 Augmented Ducky–Fuller (ADF)  Phillips–Peron (PP) 
 At level 1st difference At level 1st difference 
 statistics p-value statistics p-value statistics p-value statistics p-value 
LGDP 138.67 0.99 1,062.80 0.00 151.79 0.98 1,156.21 0.00 
LOIL 315.05 0.00 - - 301.44 0.00 - - 
LUN 362.38 0.00 - - 364.88 0.00 - - 
LFDI 509.65 0.00 - - 923.37 0.00 - - 
LCAB 429.20 0.00 - - 459.19 0.00 - - 
LMI 235.43 0.00 - - 278.75 0.00 - - 
LMOR 229.90 0.02  -- 390.70 0.00 - - 
LT 276.40 0.00 - - 298.34 0.00 - - 
Note: LGDP = Log of real GDP per capita, LOIL = Log of oil rent, LUN = Log of unemployment rate, 
LFDI = Log of foreign direct investment, LCAB = Log of current account balance, LMI = Log of military expense, 






Table A 4.4: Descriptive statistics 
 ∆LGDP  LOIL LUN LFDI LCAB LMI LMOR LT 
Mean 0.02 0.56 1.98 4.62 5.51 1.06 2.41 4.29 
Median 0.02 0.04 2.01 4.61 5.51 1.02 2.39 4.28 
Maximum 0.28 4.13 3.61 5.76 5.68 3.05 4.76 6.08 
Minimum –0.18 0.000 –3.68 2.33 5.32 0.00 0.53 2.44 
Std. Dev. 0.03 0.90 0.64 0.11 0.02 0.46 0.87 0.56 
Skewness –0.35 1.83 –0.80 –5.42 0.62 0.54 0.17 0.11 
Kurtosis 7.28 5.66 6.50 162.17 9.06 4.11 2.29 3.54 
Observations 2506 2506 2506 2506 2506 2506 2506 2506 
Note: ∆LGDP = Change in log of real GDP per capita, LOIL = Log of oil rent, LUN = Log of unemployment rate, 
LFDI = Log of foreign direct investment, LCAB = Log of current account balance, LMI = Log of military expense, 
LMOR = Log of mortality rate, LT = Log of trade openness. 
Table A 4.5: Correlation matrix 
 ∆LGDP  LOIL  LUN LFDI LCAB LMI LMOR LT 
∆LGDP  1.00        
LOIL –0.02 1.00       
LUN –0.03 –0.14 1.00      
LFDI 0.008 –0.01 –0.04 1.00     
LCAB –0.09 0.36 –0.26 0.07 1.00    
LMI –0.06 0.18 –0.02 –0.02 0.15 1.00   
LMOR 0.04 0.28 0.17 –0.14 –0.20 0.09 1.00  
LT 0.13 –0.16 –0.17 0.09 0.06 –0.19 –0.32 1.00 
Note: ∆LGDP = Change in log of real GDP per capita, LOIL = Log of oil rent, LUN = Log of unemployment rate, 
LFDI = Log of foreign direct investment, LCAB = Log of current account balance, LMI = Log of military expense, 




A 4.2.1. Pooled OLS model 
In the pooled OLS model, we have pooled all the observations in ordinary least square 
regression, meaning that implicitly we assume the coefficient is the same for all the individuals. 
This model does not hold any unobservable heterogeneity among the variables. We can write 
equation (4.1) in following way: 
∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0  +   𝛽1∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1  +  𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽4𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + Ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                                     (4.3) 
A 4.2.2. FE model 
We use the fixed effect model to further investigate the effect of oil rent on economic growth. 
The fixed effect model essentially captures all effects that are specific to an individual country 
and do not vary over time. For example, GDP per capita, trade and oil rent will vary between 
countries due to their differing geographies, natural endowments, political and cultural systems 
and other basic factors that vary between countries, but not over time. Fixed effect model 
assumes that these factors may have an impact on the predictor or outcome variable, and we 
need to control for this. Fixed effect model removes the effect of those time-invariant 
characteristics so that we can assess the net impact of oil rent on economic growth. We can 
write equation (4.1) with fixed effect as follows: 
∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0𝑖  +  𝛽1∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1  +  𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽4𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + Ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                                (4.4) 
Where  𝛽0𝑖 is the unobserved, time-invariant individual effect. 
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A 4.2.3. PFE model 
In this study, we also apply period fixed effect model. This model essentially captures all 
effects that are specific to the periods and do not vary over countries. Macroeconomic variables 
such as GDP, trade, reserve and capital can vary over time. For example, technological 
development or international agreements can change productivity growth globally which 
increases output over time. Period fixed effect model removes the effect of those country-
invariant characteristics so that we can assess the net impact of oil rent on economic growth. 
We can write equation (4.1) with fixed effect as follows: 
∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0𝑡  +   𝛽1∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1  +  𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽4𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + Ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                                 (4.5) 
Where  𝛽0𝑡 is the unobserved, country-invariant individual effect. 
A 4.2.4. RE model 
The rationale behind the random effect model is that, unlike the fixed effect model, the 
variation across countries is assumed to be random and uncorrelated with the predictor or 
independent variables included in the model. For example, in the random effect model it is 
assumed that an unobserved effect (e.g., geographical factors, natural endowments, political 
and cultural systems) are not correlated with economic growth. The random effect model 
includes all fixed effect assumptions plus the additional requirement that (Ϙ𝑖) is independent 
of all explanatory variables in all time periods. Thus, the variability of the constant for each 
section comes from: 
                                                           𝛽0𝑖  =  𝛽0 + Ϙ𝑖                                                             (4.6) 
Where Ϙ𝑖  is a zero-mean standard random variable. Therefore, equation (4.3) with 
random effect takes the following form: 
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∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0  +  𝛽1∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1  +  𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽4𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + Ϙ𝑖 + Ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                        (4.7) 
A 4.2.5. PRE model 
This model assumes that variation is arising over time to be random and uncorrelated with the 
independent variables included in the model. So, we can rewrite equation (4.7) as: 
∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0  +   𝛽1∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1  +  𝛽2𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽4𝐿𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + Σ𝑖=0
𝑛 𝛽5𝐿𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + Ϙ𝑡 + Ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                       (4.8) 
Where Ϙ𝑡  is a zero-mean standard random variable that is independent of all 




A 4.3. Robustness check 
A 4.3.1. Alternative measures of trade openness 
To check the robustness of the results, we use two alternative measures of trade openness: 
exports and imports. Tables A 4.6 and A 4.7 represent the empirical findings of the impact of 
oil rent on economic growth interacting with the two alternative measures of trade openness. 
From both tables, we find that the coefficient of oil rent is negative and significant, indicating 
that economic growth decreases with the increase of oil rent. Conversely, the positive 
coefficient of log in exports indicates that economic growth increases with the increase of 
exports. The coefficient of the interaction term between log in export and log in oil rent is 
positive and significant, indicating that the negative impact of oil rent on economic growth 
reduces with the increase of exports. The government’s total income will increase with the 
increase in export that increases real GDP per capita. 
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Table A 4.6: Change in real GDP per capita and oil rent in terms of export (1980-2017) 
 Dependent variable: ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 















































































































































































R2 0.47 0.26 0.33 0.26 0.42 0.30 
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.26 0.30 0.26 0.41 0.30 
Periods 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Countries 95 95 95 95 95 95 
Observations 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 
Note: 𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡  indicates log in exports (% of GDP). Standard errors are presented below the corresponding 
coefficients in the bracket. The asterisks ***, ** and * indicate the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. Cluster standard errors are presented in square brackets. 
We observe a similar pattern in results when we look at Table A 4.7, where we use 
imports as an alternative measure of trade openness. Economic growth increases with the 
increase of imports and the negative impact of oil rent on economic growth decrease with the 
increase of imports. A country can hire new technologies and high-tech products by allowing 
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import openness. Moreover, import helps to increase efficiency in the managerial level by 
exchanging advanced knowledge between economies. 
Table A 4.7: Change in real GDP per capita and oil rent in terms of import (1980–2017) 
 Dependent variable: ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 















































































































































































R2 0.47 0.26 0.32 0.26 0.42 0.30 
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.26 0.30 0.25 0.41 0.30 
Periods 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Countries 95 95 95 95 95 95 
Observations 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 
Note:  𝐿𝐼𝑀𝑖,𝑡 indicates log in imports (% of GDP). Standard errors are presented below the corresponding 
coefficients in the bracket. The asterisks ***, ** and * indicate the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. Cluster standard errors are presented in square brackets. 
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A 4.3.2. Alternative measures of resource abundance  
We use natural resource rent instead of oil rent to check the resource curse hypothesis and the 
impact of trade openness on economic growth. Table A 4.8 presents the empirical findings of 
the nexus between natural resource rent and economic growth interacting with trade openness 
with different dynamic panel data models. The coefficient of natural resource rent is negative, 
indicating that economic growth decreases with the increase of natural resource rent and the 
estimated elasticity is –0.05. All other things being equal, a one per cent increase in natural 
resource rents is associated with a significant decrease in the economic growth of over 0.05 per 
cent. This negative association between economic growth and natural resource rents provides 
evidence of the resource curse.  
The coefficient of the interaction term between trade openness and natural resource rent 
is also positive, indicating that a more open trade regime lessens the negative impact of natural 
resource rent on economic growth. These results are significant (p = 0.01) and consistent with 
different time and country fixed effect and random effect models. Tables A 4.9 and A 4.10 
show the impact of natural resource rent on economic growth in terms of exports and imports 
and find that both export and import reduce the resource course. 
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Table A 4.8: Change in real GDP per capita and natural resource rent in terms of trade openness 
(1980-2017)  
 Dependent variable: ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 















































































































































































R2 0.48 0.26 0.33 0.26 0.42 0.30 
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.26 0.30 0.26 0.41 0.30 
Periods 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Countries 95 95 95 95 95 95 
Observations 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 2,499 
Note: 𝐿𝑁𝑅𝑖,𝑡  indicates log in natural resource rent (% of GDP). Standard errors are presented below the 
corresponding coefficients in the bracket. The asterisks ***, ** and * indicate the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 





Table A 4.9: Change in real GDP per capita and natural resource rent in terms of export (1980-
2017) 
 Dependent variable: ∆𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 















































































































































































R2 0.48 0.26 0.33 0.26 0.42 0.30 
Adjusted R2 0.48 0.26 0.30 0.26 0.41 0.30 
Periods 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Countries 95 95 95 95 95 95 
Observations 2499 2499 2499 2499 2499 2499 
Note: Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in the bracket. The asterisks ***, ** and 





Table A 4.10: Change in real GDP per capita and natural resource rent in terms of import 
(1980-2017) 

















































































































































































R2 0.47 0.26 0.32 0.26 0.42 0.30 
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.26 0.29 0.26 0.41 0.30 
Periods 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Countries 95 95 95 95 95 95 
Observations 2499 2499 2499 2499 2499 2499 
Note: Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficients in the bracket. The asterisks ***, ** and 







In figures A 4.1.a, A 4.1.b, and A 4.1.c, we present the marginal effect of oil rent on economic 
growth in terms of exports for full sample period, and subsample periods 1980-1994 and 1995-
2017 respectively.     
Figure A 4.1.a: Marginal effect of oil rent on economic growth (1980-2017) 
 
Figure A 4.1.b: Marginal effect of oil rent on economic growth (1980-1994)                 
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Figure A 4.1.c: Marginal effect of oil rent on economic growth (1995-2017)                       
    
 
In figures A 4.2.a, A 4.2.b, and A 4.2.c, we present the marginal effect of oil rent on economic 
growth in terms of imports for full sample period, and subsample periods 1980-1994 and 1995-
2017 respectively.  





Figure A 4.2.b: Marginal effect of oil rent on economic growth (1980-1994)          
          








In figures A 4.3.a, A 4.3.b, and A 4.3.c, we present the marginal effect of natural resource rent 
on economic growth in terms of trade openness for full sample period, and subsample periods 
1980-1994 and 1995-2017 respectively.  
Figure A 4.3.a: Marginal effect of natural resource rent on economic growth (1980-
2017) 
 
Figure A 4.3.b: Marginal effect of natural resource rent on economic growth   
(1980-1994)             
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Figure A 4.3.c: Marginal effect of natural resource rent on economic growth (1995-
2017) 
     
 
In figures A 4.4.a, A 4.4.b, and A 4.4.c, we present the marginal effect of natural resource rent 
on economic growth in terms of exports for full sample period, and subsample periods 1980-
1994 and 1995-2017 respectively. 




Figure A 4.4.b: Marginal effect of natural resource rent on economic growth (1980-
1994)          
            
Figure A 4.4.c: Marginal effect of natural resource rent on economic growth (1995-






In figures A 4.5.a, A 4.5.b, and A 4.5.c, we present the marginal effect of natural resource rent 
on economic growth in terms of imports for full sample period, and subsample periods 1980-
1994 and 1995-2017 respectively.  
Figure A 4.5.a: Marginal effect of natural resource rent on economic growth (1980-
2017) 
 
Figure A 4.5.b: Marginal effect of natural resource rent on economic growth (1980-
1994)      
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Figure A 4.5.c: Marginal effect of natural resource rent on economic growth (1995-
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